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PREFACE
This paper was written by Işıkcan Aysev,  an M.Sc. student at NHH, under the supervision of Professor 
Rögnvaldur Hannesson. The aim of the study is to identify ways in which international oil companies 
(IOCs) can stay relevant and competitive in their industry the light of the challenges posed by the 
changing business environment.
The paper consists of three sections and six chapters. The paper draws conclusions from the available 
data and makes recommendations in this light.
Section A is titled ‘Research Design’ and discusses the nature of the study. 
Chapter 1, Research Question, highlights the objectives, relevance and main concepts of the study. 
Chapter 2, Literature Review & Research Methods, discusses the different lines of reasoning 
employed in the paper and reviews the literature it is based upon and explains the scientific method 
used in the research process, as well as the tools used in the process.
Section B is titled ‘Background Information’ and gives an overview of the information available on the 
subject and identifies the issues of concern.
Chapter 3, Energy Outlook, discusses the dynamics of the oil & gas industry and the future energy 
outlook.
Section C is titled ‘Strategic Issues and Case Study’ and analyzes the issues faced by IOCs in depth.
Chapter 4, Fortunes of International Oil Companies, serves as an introduction to the aforementioned 
companies, their operations, histories, current activities, strengths and weaknesses.
Chapter 5, Strategic Challenges Facing IOCs, takes an in-depth look into the challenges faced by 
IOCs, exemplified through case studies.
Chapter 6, New strategic directions for IOCs, offers recommendations for IOCs to deal with the 
challenges mentioned in chapter 5 by drawing upon the lessons from the previous chapters.
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Abstract
The study argues that the greatest challenge facing the international oil companies at the 
moment is how to replace their reserves in the face of declining access to resources, and to 
solve this issue, they will have to adopt new strategic directions to remain relevant, viable and 
profitable in the future. This argues for greater investment in technology development that 
will enable a long-term drift towards renewable sources and greater extraction of 
unconventional oil; in the short term, increasing investment in conventional E&P programs, 
partnering with NOCs in 3rd countries and reconsidering positions in high risk countries.
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Section A - Research Design
Chapter 1 - Research Question
As mentioned in the abstract, the question of how the world will fuel its future economic 
growth is a crucial one, but it is also a multi-faceted issue with economic, social and political 
dimensions. This paper shall concentrate on the economic dimension, and the scope will be 
limited to the oil & gas sector, specifically on the competitive dynamics between the 
companies in the sector.
The research paper shall be concentrated on the worldwide operations of international oil 
companies (IOC),  strategic issues facing the IOCs and suggestions for a new strategic 
paradigm for IOC operations. Following Section A regarding research design, the paper shall 
first introduce background information regarding the world energy outlook, IOCs and NOCs, 
in Section B. Thereafter, in Section C, strategic challenges facing IOCs will be analyzed with 
the help of a case study, and potential remedies will be discussed. Finally, in Section D, the 
author will build potential scenarios that may unfold in the industry with regards to the actions 
taken, draw conclusions from the research and the analysis, and offer recommendations based 
on these conclusions.
1.1. Research Objective:
The main objective of the paper is to identify ways in which IOCs can stay relevant in their 
industry in the light of the challenges posed by the changing business environment. The main 
challenge to IOCs’ business model is their lack of access to new oil reserves. As upstream 
operations typically have the greatest added value in the value chain and are its most 
profitable parts, this calls into question the long-term profitability, even the raison d'être of 
IOCs.  There are numerous questions to be answered to achieve this objective to a satisfying 
degree. These can be described as the following:
1. What are the competitive advantages and disadvantages of IOCs?
2. What is the impact of the following on the strategic direction of IOCs? 
a. Principal challenge: Reserves
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b. Resource nationalism: Venezuelan Case
c. Lack of incentives for long-term investment: BP Case
d. Competition from NOCs in 3rd countries
e. High geopolitical risks
f. Commoditizing technology
3. How can the current competitive climate be described within a game theoretical context?
4. What are the prevailing rules of the ‘game’?
5. How can IOCs play it better?
6. How can IOCs ‘change the game’?
Throughout the paper answers to these questions will be sought in order to achieve the set 
objective. By doing so, the author hopes that this study will shed light on the recent industry 
developments. Understanding the business prospects and the challenges faced by IOCs is 
crucial to understanding the long-term trends in oil & gas supplies. The study will have taken 
into account occurrences from June 2007 until September 2008. Hence, the study is important  
due to its relevance to recent industry developments and its observation of an key issue to 
future energy supply.
The study will take a ‘global’ approach to the issue and the industry rather than singling out 
regional or country specific concerns. As oil & gas industry is a globe-spanning one and IOCs  
typically operate in over 100 countries, this approach is required to have a more complete 
understanding of the subject. The line of argument will suggest that the developments 
regarding the fortunes of IOCs and the emergence of NOCs as major players in the industry 
will have global implications, however within the confines of this study the concentration 
shall be on the IOCs on the corporate level.
It is also important to address one issue that may seem to get tangled in the debate regarding 
IOCs and NOCs. This paper will not discuss the question of where the next barrel of oil 
should come from, as from the consumer’s point of view this makes little difference. From a 
public policy maker’s point of view, this may be different. The main question for the 
consumer should be if there will be enough barrels per day (b.p.d.) production for fuel prices 
to remain affordable. Whether this oil is produced by an IOC or an NOC makes little 
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difference. In this case, the challenge to IOCs is to bring forth the supplies that market is 
craving for, as they have a better record of efficiency compared to NOCs. This paper shall not 
discuss whether the IOCs are serving the world population as well as they possibly can, but 
instead shall focus on how the IOCs can improve their competitive position to serve their 
shareholders’ long-term interests.
It is the author’s sincere hope that the study will produce relevant and interesting results for 
industry practitioners, policy makers and industry observers. The methods used and the 
analysis itself may be of interest to the students of the subject of strategy as well.
Main trends that need to be addressed:
1- As large-scale, energy intensive industrial development takes places in much of the 
developing world, the energy industry will gain in importance. The world will have an 
increased need for secure, affordable and abundant energy resources.
2- The business climate and prospects for large, international oil companies is worsening.
3- Balance of power between international and national oil companies is permanently shifting 
to the benefit of the latter.
4- The international oil companies need a new strategic paradigm to successfully compete 
with national oil companies and stay relevant in the new competitive environment.
8
Chapter 2 - Literature Review & Research Methods
2.1. The theoretical line of reasoning:
Models & Theories
The basic line of reasoning was supported by primary and secondary data, and the findings 
were analyzed through models acquired from strategic management literature. In order to 
illustrate some points, such as the effects of nationalization on the companies or the 
management’s lack of incentive for long-term investments, case study approach was also 
taken.
The theoretical line of reasoning is built on understanding the fundamentals of the industry, 
the business, the environment, the competition and contemplating on how strategic decisions 
affect the competitive standing of the firm in this environment. In order to do so, several 
models were used, such as Porter’s Five Forces, Value Chain Analysis, Foundations of 
Strategic Capability, PESTEL framework, and PARTS. 
Porter’s Five Forces was a good place to begin with external analysis, as it allows one to take 
a snapshot of the competitive situation in the industry. This allowed us to see the competitive 
situation that has been unfolding around the firm and its effects.
The internal dynamics of these companies were investigated by using value chain analysis, in 
this case focused on Shell’s value chain, to see where the real value lies in the business and 
understand the overriding interests of the firm. 
Then, the author concentrated on the internal devices the firm has to pursue these interests, 
namely its resources and competencies, by using the foundations of strategic capability 
model. This way, it was possible to see the strong and weak points the firm had in its strategic 
capability.
Hence the question became how weak, or how strong. In order to answer this question, data 
from the five chosen companies were reviewed and compared, with the aim of pinpointing the 
competitive standing of each company.
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Following the broad analysis of the companies and their environment, several of the strategic 
challenges that face the industry were addressed. While addressing these trends, the PESTEL 
framework was used to understand the firm’s interaction with its environment throughout the 
Venezuelan case. 
In the final stage, a more game theoretic approach was taken. The PARTS model was used to 
evaluate the strategic decisions that face the firms. This model was suitable in particular 
because it allows one to see the game the firm is engaged in and which action it may take to 
succeed in the game or alter the game. Following the game theoretic line of thought, 
Axelrod’s suggestions for changing the game were built upon the implications of the PARTS 
model. The result is a prescriptive answer to the challenges mentioned earlier.
Literature & Secondary Data
In order to follow this theoretical line of thought, several academic publications were utilized. 
These were mainly of two subjects: literature on strategy & game theory subjects and 
literature on oil & gas subjects. This literature served as a source for theoretical subjects and 
as a source of secondary data.
Strategy and game theory literature, such as Axelrod, Brandenburger & Nalebuff, Hofstader, 
Johnson, Scholes & Whittington books or articles were used to build a theoretical grounding 
for the paper. Johnson, Scholes & Whittington textbook provided most of the basic theoretical 
grounding used in the paper, such as Five Forces or value chain analysis. On the other hand, 
Axelrod, Brandenburger & Nalebuff and Hofstader articles were used to build on this 
grounding with concepts from game theory.
Research publications on oil & gas subjects were also used, such as Baker Institute Policy 
reports on oil companies, some of them from Hartley, Medlock & Eller, Jaffe, a book by 
Hannesson on petroleum economics with many insights on the workings of the oil & gas 
markets and an article by Mommer on Venezuelan oil industry. These publications provided a 
better understanding of the industry, the challenges the firms face and also insights about the 
particular cases, such as Venezuela. Several institutional publications, such as those from 
BCG, Ernst & Young, and PriceWaterhouseCoopers were also used for their analysis and 
insights into the oil & gas industry.
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2.2. The empirical line of reasoning:
News articles
A good deal of the primary data gathered for the paper have come from news articles in 
reputed newswires, newspapers, magazines and other media sources. Also, annual reports 
published by the oil companies investigated were a valuable source for primary data. Primary 
data from institutional publications, such as studies from IEA, IMF and UNEP, and data from 
CIFP were also instrumental.
Data from news articles form an important part of the primary data used for the paper. Articles 
going as far back as 2004, but mostly from 2007 and 2008, were used. The time frame is 
relevant in discussing the developments that have taken place in the industry. This paper is 
mainly focused on developments from mid 2007 until late 2008. The sources for the news 
articles that were used were reputed publications such as Associated Press, Reuters, Financial 
Times, Bloomberg, the Guardian, CNN, The New York Times, Forbes, The Times, Business 
Week, and Newsweek. This primary data is considered to be accurate and trustworthy to a 
large degree.
Company annual reports
The largest part of the primary data used in the paper comes from the companies themselves. 
By reading and extracting data from the annual reports of BP, Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, 
and ConocoPhillips, the author was able to understand some of the internal dynamics of the 
firms and their competitiveness. This source of primary data can be considered as entirely 
accurate and reliable, as it is also submitted to stock exchanges and shareholders.
Institutional publications
The last part of the primary data that was used comes from institutional publications such as 
CIFP, IEA, IMF or UNEP. This data is also highly reliable, and most of this data was used to 
fill in the gaps with regards to the industrial dynamics, oil and gas sectors or assessments of 
geopolitical risks.
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Section B - Background
Chapter 3 - Energy Outlook
3.1. Introduction
With the massive ongoing industrialization of populous developing economies such as China 
and India, the world has never needed as much as energy as it does today. The question of 
how energy is supplied, produced and consumed, moreover, by whom this is done, 
has become a crucial one. Not least because of concerns regarding how human activity at 
large is impacting the planet, but also because of an array of political, economic and 
environmental interests, the debate on energy issues has become the number one issue of 
interest for the international community.
At the epicenter of the issue is oil, its price, supply, demand, production, exploration and the 
sustainability questions regarding all these elements. In 2005, world oil reserves stood at 
1,148 billion barrels, with international oil companies (IOCs) controlling a less than 10% 
share and a 77% share being commanded by national oil companies (NOCs).1 This number 
was up from 72% in 20042, suggesting a market environment that is rapidly being dominated 
by NOCs. While the global oil industry continues to have an oligopolistic structure, the 
importance of IOCs with regard to NOCs in the field of production has significantly eroded 
over the course of the last four decades through nationalization of domestic oil industries in 
many key oil exporting countries.
 Key to this debate is the oil, gas and power industries that are now involved in developing a 
variety of energy sources. At the forefront of the issue, there are the IOCs, some of them who 
have styled themselves as 'energy' companies. This study will commonly refer to IOCs, and 
by this it will be describing the ‘Big Five’3. The IOCs over the course of 2007 have had 
several setbacks in their overseas operations stemming from disputes with the domestic 
government and the NOC. Shell in Sakhalin II, Russia, and Exxon Mobil, amongst others, in 
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1 Baker Institute Policy Report 2007, The changing role of national oil companies in international energy markets, James 
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, Houston, p. 1.
2 International Monetary Fund 2006, IMF World Economic Outlook 2006, International Monetary Fund,  p. 38.
3 Exxon Mobil Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell p.l.c., BP p.l.c., Chevron Corporation and ConocoPhillips Company.
Venezuela, as discussed in Chapter 5, have suffered setbacks due to the host country’s 
political climate. The increased frequency of such disruptions of IOC operations in such a 
manner suggests a hostile institutional climate in the several of the important countries IOCs 
are operating in.
Then there are the increasingly important and assertive NOCs, once regarded as the 'rent 
collector for the landlord states'4, playing a noticeably more significant role in exploration and 
production of oil and gas. For the purposes of this study, several NOCs5 will be discussed in 
detail. Not only do some of these NOCs have a monopoly on oil reserves at home, but are also 
assuming a more assertive role abroad. This greater role played by NOCs has brought new 
challenges to IOCs, but not without the potential opportunities.
 The central question raised in this paper is how international oil companies (IOCs) can adjust 
their corporate strategies to both compete and cooperate with national oil companies in a 
distinctly hostile climate. 
Let us now discuss the four main claims that form the background of the analysis in this 
paper.
a. Developments in the energy industry is becoming increasingly important to the world 
economy. The world will have an increased need for secure, affordable and abundant energy 
resources.
Energy, more specifically oil, has been crucial to the industrial development of the 20th 
century. How the economic growth is being powered has always been a question for policy 
makers, on one hand. On the other hand, the question of who has the means to supply the 
required energy source (coal in the past, oil and gas today) remains as an important one for 
politicians. The energy crises in 1970s and 1980s compounded the fears that a curb in the 
world oil supply could severely hurt the world economy. They also underlined how oil 
dependent the industrial world had become. 
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4 Mommer, B. 1994, The political role of national oil companies in exporting countries: the Venezuelan Case, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, p. 7
5 Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), OAO Gazprom (Russia), CNPC (China), StatoilHydro (Norway).
The current state of affairs is not very different. According to the International Energy Agency 
estimates 35% of world’s primary energy supply came from oil, and this share is unlikely to 
change over the next 25 years according to the agency’s main scenario projections.6 This 
scenario also projects that share of natural gas in the global energy supply mix will increase 
from 21% in 2003 to 25% in 2030. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ estimates, the 
world’s primary energy consumption will go up from 10 billion tonnes of oil equivalent (btoe) 
to 15 btoe by 2025, and 21 btoe by 2050.7 According to these projections, we may conclude 
that the share of oil & gas in the world energy mix, as well as their use in absolute terms, is 
only going to increase over the next 25 years. This reflects the still significant influence of oil 
& gas supplies and their prices to the world. Therefore the activities of the suppliers of these 
commodities, IOCs and NOCs, will be as relevant as ever to the world economy.
However, the challenges today are even more complex than those of the past. As the 
Economist8 points out, the world is facing two different types of energy anxiety: one is the 
concern about affordable fuel, while the other is the panic over global warming. The issue of 
energy, how it is supplied and the sustainability of this supply looms large in the public eye. 
The developments in the industry therefore will become more important to world economy 
and the lifestyles of the world’s inhabitants in the coming decades.
b. The business climate and prospects for large, international oil companies is worsening.
According to the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW) annual survey, quoted by Jaffe, only 
three out of the Big Five IOCs make it into the top 20 upstream oil & gas companies in the 
world, ranked on the basis of oil and gas reserve holdings9, these being Exxon Mobil, BP and 
Chevron. This underlines the reduced role IOCs will have to assume in the future of world oil 
supply as second-tier suppliers, a far cry from the days of the ‘Seven Sisters’. Reserve 
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6 IEA (2005), World Energy Outlook (Paris: International Energy Agency/OECD 
Publications). 
7 PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2006, The World in 2050: Implications of global growth for carbon emissions and climate 
change policy, , p. 33.
8 Rachman, G. 2007, "The paradoxical politics of energy", The Economist, December 2007, p. 95.
9 Jaffe, A. M.; Soligo R. 2007, "The international oil companies", James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice 
University, Houston, p. 10.
Figure 2 - The One-Shot Game
holdings are a crucial indicator for the long-term prospects of an oil company, and the data 
suggest that the IOCs prospects are rather bleak in this respect in comparison to the NOCs. 
Less than one quarter of world’s proven oil reserves are available to IOCs for development, 
and only about 10% is currently under IOC control10. The prospects for replacement of these 
reserves does not appear to be bright either, with the Big Five depleting their reserves with a 
replacement ratio of 82% from 1999 to 200711. Meanwhile the exploration activities, which 
are meant to counter this decline and increase reserve holdings, have suffered a decline in real 
terms due to increasing exploration costs. This particular trend suggests lower future 
production rate for IOCs.
In addition to the decline in reserve holdings, several major oil producing countries have 
virtually made the business climate uninhabitable for IOCs, through institutional 
entanglements and outright nationalization, such as Russia and Venezuela. These 
developments suggest worsening prospects for the viability, profitability and ultimately the 
relevance of the IOCs as we know them.
c. Balance of power between international and national oil companies is permanently shifting 
to the benefit of the latter.
The current situation in terms of reserve holdings suggest a shift in the relative importance of 
NOCs with regards to IOCs. Most NOCs have a monopoly on their home oil reserves, and are 
becoming increasingly more active on the international stage, for example StatoilHydro or 
PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC. NOCs have increasingly better access to managerial, 
technical and financial expertise, which they lacked in the past. This raises the question if 
NOCs actually need to deal with IOCs at all, if the technology is being commoditized and the 
required capital is abundant, as they already possess the reserves? Even if they do, is there any 
reason to give them a role larger than that of a service contractor? IOCs ultimately have to 
deal and negotiate with host governments and NOCs to get access to the reserve holdings in a 
country, and the current situation suggest that they are dealt a rather bad hand when they get 
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10 Baker Institute Policy Report 2007, The changing role of national oil companies in international energy markets, 
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, Houston, p. 1.
11 Jaffe, A. M.; Soligo R. 2007, "The international oil companies", James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice 
University, Houston, p. 24.
Figure 4 - Alternative Second Round Bidding
to the table. Therefore, there is a shift in the balance of power and in the terms of negotiation 
to the detriment of IOCs. Is it permanent? There are many variables that lead to the answer of 
this particular question, amongst them the relevance of oil as the major energy source, 
political climate in the host countries, technological advances.
d. The international oil companies need a new strategic paradigm to successfully compete 
with national oil companies and stay relevant in the new competitive environment.
As the study will show, IOCs have worsening fortunes and unless they employ a significant 
shift in the way they do business, these companies will have progressively smaller roles in the 
future of world energy. The new realities of the industry suggest that these companies need to 
learn how to compete and cooperate with their nationally-owned counterparts in order to stay 
relevant to the industry. 
By starting off from these main trends, the study will be exploring the oil & gas industry, 
IOCs, NOCs, strategic issues that surface and explain these issues through the application of 
several theoretical frameworks to real case studies.
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3.2. Introduction to the business environment
3.2.1. Increasing price of crude oil
According to BP Annual Review, the world primary energy consumption increased by 2.4% in 
2006, with the oil consumption growing by 0.7%. Oil continues to claim the largest share in 
the world energy mix.12 Please see the figure 3.1 below:
Figure 3.1, Source: BP p.l.c. 2007, BP Annual Review 
2007 [online], p. 6,  Available from: www.bp.com/
annualreview [Accessed: 24.03.2008]. 
Year of 2007 saw the yearly average crude oil 
price reach a new record of $72.39/bbl, 
increasing 11% from the previous year. 
According to BP Annual Review 2007, the 
prices rose from $58.62/bbl in the beginning of 
the year to $96.02/bbl at the end.13 By March 
2008, within the space of ten years, from 1997 
to 2008, the prices for Brent crude had reached 
to over $100/bbl.14 BP accorded the drastic 
increase during 2007 mainly to OPEC 
production cuts early in the year, continuing growth in consumption and end of summer drop 
in inventories as a result.15 A graph taken from the publication can be seen below, in figure 
3.2:
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12 BP p.l.c. 2007, BP Annual Review 2007 [online], p. 6,  Available from: www.bp.com/annualreview [Accessed: 
24.03.2008].
13 BP p.l.c. 2007, BP Annual Review 2007 [online], p. 6,  Available from: www.bp.com/annualreview [Accessed: 
24.03.2008].
14 Bloomberg Marketdata: Energy Prices 2008 [online],  Available from: http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/ [Accessed: 
24.03.2008].
15 BP p.l.c. 2007, BP Annual Review 2007 [online], p. 6,  Available from: www.bp.com/annualreview [Accessed: 
24.03.2008].
Industr y context In 2007, energy was again a major topic of debate 
and analysis among policy makers and the public, 
with continued concern over energy security, 
safety and climate change.
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Energy prices  In 2007, the average 
crude oil price (dated Brent) rose by 
11% to $72.39/bbl, a new record in 
money-of-the-day terms. Daily prices 
began the year at $58.62/bbl and rose to 
$96.02/bbl at year-end, owing to OPEC 
production cuts in early 2007, sustained 
consumption growth and the resulting 
drop in commercial inventories after 
the summer. The average US natural gas 
price (Henry Hub First of Month Index) 
fell by 5% in 2007, pressured by record 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports in the 
summer, continued growth in domestic 
production and record inventory levels. 
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Energy worldwide  Continued ab ve-
average global economic growth 
supported increasing energy demand 
and oil consumption worldwide, despite 
higher prices. World primary energy 
consumption increased by 2.4% in 
2006, just above the 10-year average. 
The impact of continued above-average 
economic growth was partially offset by 
high prices. Global oil consumption grew 
by 0.7% in 2006, the weakest growth 
since 2001. Coal continued to be the 
world’s fastest-growing hydrocarb n 
in 2006 at 4.5%.
Europe and Eurasia
Middle East
Africa
South and Central America
North America
Asia Pacific
GLOBAL PROVED OIL RESERVES AT END 2006b
(billion barrels)
40.5
59.9
103.5
117.2
144.4
742.7
Global reserves  Global proved oil 
and natural gas reserves have been 
on a generally increasing trend since 
1980 and remain adequate to cover 
expected consumption for decades 
to come. Proved oil reserves continued 
to exceed 1.2 trillion barrels at the 
end of 2006, equivalent to sustaining 
current production levels for more 
than 40 years. World proved natural 
gas reserves exceeded 181 trillion cubic 
metres, equivalent to sustaining current 
production for more than 60 years.
aSource: Platts.
bSource: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007.
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Fig. 3.2, Source: BP p.l.c. 2007, BP 
Annual Review 2007 [online], p. 6,  
Available from: www.bp.com/
annualreview [Accessed: 24.03.2008].
It is argued that the oil market has 
moved from a supply-driven market to 
a demand-driven one.16 The spare oil 
production capacity has decreased 
from 10 m.b.d. to 2.5 m.b.d., which 
represents a significant decrease in the 
suppliers’ capability to respond to 
drastic, short-term changes in supply and demand.
The high oil prices make previously uneconomical fields financially viable for development, 
which in turn drives greater investment in these fields, resulting in a increase in supply and 
eventual decline of the oil price. A very high oil price would permanently establish new 
suppliers, for instance fringe producing countries, as large oil investments are not rolled back 
in the face of declining prices. This would result in a permanent increase in the oil supply, an 
unattractive proposition for the current suppliers. It could also cause a slowdown in the global 
economy due to decreasing demand as consumers switch the alternatives, hence lowering the 
prices in the longer-term. 
Meanwhile, the development drive for these new resources will put a strain on the supply of 
all the goods and services required to undertake oil & gas production. These costs involve 
everything from charter rates for rigs and supply vessels, field service and project 
management costs, to raw material costs and technical personnel costs.17 Complicating things 
18
16 Zakaria, F. 2008, Why we can’t quit [online], Newsweek,  Available from: http://www.newsweek.com/id/123482?
tid=relatedcl [Accessed: 27.03.2008].
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Industr y context In 2007, energy was again a major topic of debate 
and analysis among policy makers and the public, 
with continued concern over energy security, 
safety and climate change.
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Energy prices  In 2007, the average 
crude oil price (dated Brent) rose by 
11% to $72.39/bbl, a new record in 
money-of-the-day terms. Daily prices 
began the year at $58.62/bbl and rose to 
$96.02/bbl at year-end, owing to OPEC 
production cuts in early 2007, sustained 
consumption growth and the resulting 
drop in commercial inventories after 
the summer. The average US natural gas 
price (Henry Hub First of Month Index) 
fell by 5% in 2007, pressured by record 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports in the 
summer, continued growth in domestic 
production and record inventory levels. 
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Energy worldwide  Continued above-
average global economic growth 
supported increasing energy demand 
and oil consumption worldwide, despite 
higher prices. World primary energy 
consumption increased by 2.4% in 
2006, just above the 10-year average. 
The impact of continued above-average 
economic growth was partially offset by 
high prices. Global oil consumption grew 
by 0.7% in 2006, the weakest growth 
since 2001. Coal continued to be the 
world’s fastest-growing hydrocarbon 
in 2006 at 4.5%.
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Global reserves  Global proved oil 
and natural gas reserves have been 
on a generally increasing trend since 
1980 and remain adequate to cover 
expected consumption for decades 
to come. Proved oil reserves continued 
to exceed 1.2 trillion barrels at the 
end of 2006, equivalent to sustaining 
current production levels for more 
than 40 years. World proved natural 
gas reserves exceeded 181 trillion cubic 
metres, equivalent to sustaining current 
production for more than 60 years.
aSource: Platts.
bSource: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007.
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even more, these costs are not directly linked to the oil price, but are affected by it, meaning 
that the costs fluctuate regardless of oil price fluctuations.
So what do permanently higher oil prices mean for IOCs? Higher prices for oil will certainly 
be followed by more investment in development of oil reserves, both by IOCs and NOCs. The 
question is how much of these reserves will be developed by IOCs and how much by NOCs. 
The rising oil prices will have three primary effects on IOCs, firstly, they will make 
development of higher cost reserves affordable, secondly, they will strengthen the capital 
positions of NOCs, thirdly will drive up the costs of exploration due to rising costs of drilling 
equipment and personnel. Therefore, the higher prices can be described as a mixed blessing 
for the IOCs, as the net effect will be to increase competition.
3.2.2. Changes in natural gas markets
Natural gas represents close to a quarter of the world energy consumption. It is a key fuel in 
electric production, for its relative efficiency, but above all in the industrial sector, which 
accounted for 44 percent of the world consumption in 2004. It is also present in domestic 
uses, such as heating or cooking. Gas attractiveness has been accentuated in the past few years 
by a steady increase in oil prices, as well as a rising concerns about climate change. Thus, 
consumption is expected to keep growing in the future; according to a projection of the IAE 
(International Agency for Energy), it should increase by 63 % by 2030.18 
Gas use is increasingly seen as an alternative to oil use, yet its physical properties are 
obviously very different from oil characteristics, and this determines the structure of the gas 
market. First, gas is bulky: 1000 m3 of natural gas have approximately the same energy 
content as 1m3 of oil; secondly, natural gas is quite difficult to handle, which is reflected by its 
high costs transportation. High economies of scale and high investments (needed to extract 
and transport gas) are the main characteristics of natural monopoly. Furthermore, owing to the 
transportation problem, gas market is organised in regional markets. In most of the cases, 
production and consumption areas match each other, but this is not so for Europe, ex-USSR 
and Africa. Western and Central Europe in particular is largely dependent to Russian gas, with 
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its reserves less than 4% of world reserves, and its consumption nearly twice as high as its 
production.
Russia is the country that particularly interests us here. It has huge energy resources, among 
them the biggest gas reserves in the world, and it produces a third of the world total output of 
natural gas. Russian gas provides more than a quarter of European gas demand. Gas sector in 
the country has remained largely state-controlled since communist times, export pipelines 
remaining entirely under state control. Russia largest energy company is the government-
controlled Gazprom, which possesses tremendous natural-gas reserves. Its share in the global 
and Russian gas production is nearly 20 and 90 per cent, respectively. Gazprom's ambition, as 
can be read on its website, is to take “leading positions in the global energy market, and to 
increase the Company’s authority and influence in the world community”. 
The recent trends in the natural gas markets have shown a certain form of natural gas, 
liquified natural gas (LNG), taking a more prominent role. This may mean that the future 
trajectory of the market may be towards an integrated global market, rather than fragmented 
regional ones. It is possible to ship LNG around the globe, in similar fashion to crude oil, 
which would create a global marketplace for natural gas
3.2.3 Renewable energy
Energy that comes from self-renewing sources, such as solar, wind and hydro power is 
defined as ‘renewable energy’. According to the IEA, more renewable energy will increase 
the diversity of energy sources, replace diminishing fossil fuels in the long-term, and will help 
decrease carbon emissions.19 The main barrier for these energy generation methods has been 
the cost associated with them. IEA argues that further market penetration by renewable 
sources is possible with the application of economic, market and regulatory instruments, 
while noting that some forms of renewable energy are already competitive, due to the high 
prices of conventional fuels.
The question for IOCs is how they should relate to renewable energy. BP has begun 
considering itself ‘beyond petroleum’ since late 1990’s, but the reality is that the company has 
made token investments in the field and its renewable division does not generate large 
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revenues. Shell has silently divested itself from renewables in the recent years. Meanwhile, 
Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips and Chevron do not have any investments in renewables. The 
question is: should they? It is unclear whether it is wise for oil companies to invest in less 
profitable renewables than highly profitable oil & gas developments. From a financial point of 
view, the answer is clear; capital should follow the highest returns, which lie, at the moment, 
in oil & gas investments. The picture may be murkier from a strategic point of view. Later on 
in the paper, it will be argued that for IOCs that struggle to replace their reserves due to a 
number of reasons, but still have capital to invest, renewables could very well be option.
Before going in detail, let us briefly look at the current state of renewables and the types of 
renewable sources available. Please see figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3, Source: International Energy Agency http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/
key_stats_2007.pdf
As one can see, the renewables in the sense that is described earlier do not make up a 
significant part of the world energy supply mix. In fact, in three decades, it has only increased 
from 0.1% in 1973 to 0.5% in 2005. It is a large increase, but from a small base. While the 
world energy supply as a whole has doubled, renewables’ contribution increased ten-fold, yet 
remained insignificant to the energy equation. This may be changing, as a UNEP report in 
21
2007 found that the investment in the renewable energy sector worldwide increase from $80 
billion in 2005 to $100 billion in 2007.20 
Figure 3.4, Source: International Energy Agency, http://www.iea-retd.org/files/Barriers%20Challenges%20and
%20Opportunities.pdf
This number soared to $148 billion in 2008. This so-called ‘Gold Rush’ was led by wind 
energy investments, which, at around $50 billion, accounted for one-third of the total 
investment. This was followed by solar energy investments, at $28.6 billion. UNEP expects 
investment in renewable energy to top $450 billion by 2012, and $600 billion by 2020.21
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3.3. Structural analysis of the oil & gas industry
3.3.1. Industry outlook
The global oil industry remains an oligopoly with about twenty national and international oil 
companies controlling 80% of the world production.22 There is also an extreme concentration 
in the industry on a global scale, with largest 25 private oil firms accounting for 92% of 
profits and 94% of reserves in the hands of the private sector, according to the Oil and Gas 
Journal.23
As mentioned earlier, 77% of the world's remaining conventional oil reserves are closed to 
IOCs.24 In addition, IOCs face greater demands from host governments in terms of royalties, 
resource rent and profit taxes in the locations they are allowed to operate in. Due to the 
nationalization of oil companies in the Middle East, these resources are off-limits to IOCs.25 
In fact, according to ConocoPhillips’ analysis, seen below in detail, only 7% of the reserves 
can be classified ‘fully’ accessible to IOCs.26
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There also appears to be a drive towards greater national and state control of natural resources 
such as oil and gas in countries that have traditionally been hospitable towards IOCs. One 
example of this is Venezuela, the world’s fifth-largest oil exporter, which increased the state’s 
control over the oil production in the country substantially. Venezuelan state tightened its grip 
over its domestic oil industry, compelling oil companies to give a higher share of profits to the 
state. One of the majors operating in Venezuela, Exxon Mobil, declined to do so. The 
company’s control over its oil production facilities in Venezuela was subsequently 
relinquished. Behind the scenes, the Venezuelan government was seeking to engage oil & gas 
projects with NOCs from friendly countries to replace the IOC presence in the country. In 
2005, Venezuela issued exclusive exploration licenses to seven NOCs, among them CNPC 
(China), ONGC (India) and Petropars (Iran).27
3.3.2. Porterʼs Five Forces analysis for IOCs
In order to have an accurate overview of the market conditions faced by IOCs we shall subject 
the oil industry to qualitative analysis through Porter’s Five Forces framework.28 Within this 
framework, we shall take the point of view of an IOC and examine its relations to its buyers 
and suppliers, as well as threats of entry and of substitutes. The model can be seen in 
Appendix 4.a. Throughout this analysis, we assume the firm in question is an integrated oil 
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major, which handles the oil&gas from the reservoir and takes it all the way to the gas tank or 
power station. 
Bargaining power of the buyers
Let us first observe the power of the buyers. The buyer are defined as the purchasers of the 
firm’s products, in this case these would be either power companies, airlines or individual car 
owners. We shall estimate the buyer power by looking at their concentration, costs of 
switching away from the supplier and possibility of backward integration. 
In terms of concentration, it is reasonable to claim that there is no significant buyer power in 
this regard; as buying power is dispersed among many firms and individuals, none of them 
hold enough buying power to affect the competitive situation in the market. 
The costs of switching, however, are quite low for some buyer segments, and high for others. 
For individual consumers, there is usually the choice of choosing one or the other when it 
comes to purchasing gasoline in an area. However, power plants or airlines tend to be more 
locked-in with their supplier, usually due to long-term contracts or distribution channels, such 
as one fuel supplier being available at an airport. 
The possibility of backward integration by the buyers is rather low, as no individual consumer 
or airline would start an oil company just to have access to fuels. As a result, it can be 
concluded that the power of buyers is rather low within the Five Forces framework, and they 
have limited effect on the competitive dynamics.
Bargaining power of suppliers
Secondly, let us assess the power of the integrated oil major’s suppliers. The suppliers would 
almost certainly be the owners of the natural resource reserves that the firms seek to exploit, 
namely nation states with oil & gas resources or their NOCs. 
According to ENI S.p.A.’s World Oil and Gas Review 2007, the top ten oil reserve holders 
hold 84.5% of all known oil reserves, which does represent a high supplier concentration.29 
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Iran 89,300 88,200 93,000 93,000 89,700 89,700 89,700 89,700 89,700 125,800 125,800 132,460 136,270
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Venezuela 64,500 64,500 64,900 71,700 72,600 72,600 76,862 77,685 77,800 77,800 77,226 79,729 80,012
Russia 48,400 49,000 48,573 48,573 48,573 48,573 48,573 48,573 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
Libya 22,800 29,500 29,500 29,500 29,500 29,500 29,500 29,500 29,500 36,000 39,000 39,126 41,464
Nigeria 17,900 20,800 15,500 16,800 22,500 22,500 22,500 24,000 24,000 25,000 35,255 35,876 36,220
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Angola 5,400 5,400 5,400 5,400 5,412 5,412 5,412 5,412 5,412 5,412 5,412 5,412 8,000
Norway 9,400 8,400 11,200 10,400 10,900 10,800 9,447 9,447 10,265 10,447 8,500 7,705 7,849
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Costs of switching for suppliers is only significant in the contracts they have with the IOCs 
for the developed fields, but it is virtually none for undeveloped fields. 
The possibility of forward integration by the suppliers is high, and it is a common occurrence. 
The very theme of this paper deals with this issue, in fact. The reserve holding countries 
increasingly prefer to exploit their resources through NOCs, as seen in the Middle East 30, 
Russia31, and Venezuela32. 
Therefore, we conclude that the bargaining power of the suppliers, namely reserve holding 
states, is high towards the IOC, due to high supplier concentration, low costs of switching and 
possibilities for forward integration.
Barriers to entry
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Thirdly, we shall examine the threat of potential entrants to the market. The oil & gas industry  
almost certainly favours those firms with economies of scale, as oil & gas companies need 
access to reserves and production streams while exploring for new reserves.33 
The capital requirements for entry are significant, as most exploration efforts for oil do not 
result in worthwhile finds and the capital costs of setting up a production facility are 
tremendous.34 A different dynamic is at work in gas production, as the storage and 
transportation, as well as production, involve high capital costs.35 
Access to supply channels could certainly constitute a  threat, as supply is scarce and 
suppliers are able to forward integrate, as argued earlier. Access to distribution channels is not 
a significant point, as IOCs are in fact the firms with access to distribution channels on an 
international scale. Their hold on international distribution channels in downstream 
constitutes an entry barrier for new entrants, while the same does not apply in upstream 
operations. However, it should be noted that in some markets competition is not as intense as 
in the others.
It is reasonable to claim that there is little supplier loyalty to the IOCs, unless the supplier, a 
sovereign country, in question is the home country of the IOC, therefore this lack of loyalty 
does constitute a threat of potential entrants. As most significant entrants to the market are 
NOCs, it is hard to see how IOCs can hold a credible claim of expected retaliation. One way 
could be legal challenges if there is a breach of contract, as in Exxon Mobil - Venezuela 
case,36 however other than this case, it is difficult for the IOC to retaliate in the host country 
of the emerging NOC. It is a different story in the IOC home country or third-countries, of 
course, as it will be discussed later on. 
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Government action or legislation certainly promotes the threat of entry towards the firm, as 
‘landlord’ states will typically move to exploit their natural resources through the state-owned 
NOC.37 The latest incidence exemplifying the case is the nationalisation of oil industry in 
Venezuela. Experience constitutes a barrier to entry for potential entrants, as the capabilities 
for oil exploration and production are built up over time and require specific technological 
resources. Differentiation is not a relevant dimension as the products in question are 
commodities. 
All in all, we conclude that while the IOCs have certain barriers to entry set up against private 
potential entrants, such as experience, access to supply and distribution, high capital costs and 
economies of scale, these barriers do not apply to emerging NOCs, as these firms typically are 
backed by their home country government politically and financially. Therefore, we conclude 
that NOCs pose a threat as potential competitors in third-country markets. For instance, in the 
form of Chinese NOCs investing in Angola and crowding out IOC investment in the country.
Threat of substitutes
Fourthly, we shall observe the threat of substitutes to the IOC operations. IOCs provide the 
world with mainly oil & gas products, and in addition to other means of energy production, 
such as BP, which as investments in wind power.38 However, it is worth noting that these 
investments are rather limited in size and scope. In essence, there are three types of 
substitution that could conceivably take place: substitution of need, generic substitution and 
product-for-product substitution. 
One may eliminate the substitution of need out of hand, as the world will always need some 
form of energy, unless the peoples of the world decide to revert back to the pre-industrial 
evolution period by drastically reducing their living standards, something that is quite unlikely  
to happen. The need for energy is unlikely to be rendered redundant. 
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Generic substitution is more likely, as the consumers will tend to lower their consumption in 
the face of high prices, such as the prevailing prices in 2008 of over $100 per barrel, by 
switching to more fuel-efficient cars or bicycles.39 However, it is also argued that the share of 
energy spending of consumer income has dropped significantly over the last 20 years, 
therefore consumers are less likely to curb their consumption in the face of price increases. 
The share of energy expenditure of consumer income was recorded 6%, down from 8% two 
decades ago, meaning that consumer incomes have grown faster than the oil prices.40 It is 
worth mentioning that this share only reflects direct consumer spending on energy, such as 
gasoline for transportation and natural gas for heating, but not indirect spending. The demand 
for gasoline is increasing within the OECD countries,41 as can be seen in in figure 4.6.
Source: IEA 12 Month Moving Average Demand vs. Year/Year growth (%) - Total OECD Gasoline Demand 
2008 [online],  Available from: http://omrpublic.iea.org/demand/demdg_oc.pdf [Accessed: 27.03.2008].
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Transportation fuels such as gasoline accounts for 50% of world oil demand42 Therefore, 
competition for disposable income of the consumers is not intense, and as the share of energy 
prices in consumer income is not very large, a high increase in per barrel price of oil does not 
reflect that strongly in consumer incomes, preventing a drop in demand. 
Product-for-product substitution means a switch away from oil & gas as means of energy 
generation. Although over time this switch will take place, as oil & gas, non-renewable 
resources, are depleted or their production is rendered uneconomic, this is unlikely to happen 
any time soon. There are many other potential sources of energy available, such as solar, 
wind, hydroelectric, tidal, biological, hydrogen, nuclear or geothermal, the key word here is 
‘potential’. Potentially, these sources hold great promise, but each comes with their own 
drawbacks. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that fossil fuels will continue to be the 
primary sources of energy, as predicted by the IEA projections.43 Therefore a switch away 
from fossil fuels, the main products of the IOC, do constitute a threat of substitutes, albeit in a 
very long-term perspective.
Overall, the threat of substitutes for IOC’s main product offerings are not significant in the 
short to medium term, as the demand is very strong and alternatives not yet economical. 
Competitive rivalry
Finally, let us see how these forces affect the competitive rivalry within the industry by 
turning towards the intra-industry dynamics. Five dimensions will be considered, balance, 
growth rates, fixed costs, exit barriers and differentiation.
With regard to competitive balance, it is important to define the confines of the comparison. If 
the Big Five IOCs are compared to independent or smaller IOCs, then certainly their only 
sizeable competitors are each other, as the Big Five account for 72.9% of all profits and 
73.8% of all proven crude oil reserves in the private sector.44 However, when compared to 
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NOCs, the story is different. With regard to NOCs, the Big Five companies hold less than 
10% of the world’s oil and gas resource base, making them comparatively small players.45 
Therefore, competitive balance is tilted against the IOC at the moment, as they are relegated 
to being second-tier players in terms of reserves and production by NOCs. In terms of relative 
size, the Big Five are similar to each other and have access to similar resources, intensifying 
the rivalry.
There is high growth in the market for oil products, especially in developing countries. 
According to IEA, the global oil demand growth will be around 2% in 2008, with 
significantly higher growth rates in the Middle East, (6.1%) and China, (5.6%).46 The 
increasing demand for oil products suggests that the rivalry will not intensify due to low 
market growth.
High fixed costs continue to be a feature of the global oil and gas industry, as both exploration 
and production activities have high fixed costs. Exit barriers in individual countries could 
arguably be low, as there are always rival companies looking to buy acreage, however, it is 
inconceivable that the firms could exit from oil & gas business altogether. The products are 
commodities, so there is little room for differentiation, perhaps in the downstream operations.
Overall, the competitive rivalry in the industry is high, due to the competitive balance, high 
fixed costs, high exit barriers and lack of product differentiation. High supplier power of 
landlord states and threat of potential NOC entrants represent additional difficulties for IOCs, 
while buyers have little bargaining power and few substitutes. This analysis suggests that 
upstream operations of the firm are affected more than the downstream ones.
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Section C - Strategic Issues and Analysis
Chapter 4 - Fortunes of International Oil Companies (IOCs)
4.1. Introduction to the integrated oil major
As of 2008, only four of the so-called Seven Sisters of the oil industry remain, these being 
Exxon Mobil, BP, Shell and Chevron. These firms, as well as US-based ConocoPhillips, 
French Total, and Italian ENI, which have emerged through privatisation and consolidations, 
form the group of ‘super-majors’ that account for 72.9% of all profits and 73.8% of all proven 
crude oil reserves in the hands of the private sector globally, according to data from Oil & Gas 
Journal Data Book 200647. Out of these seven companies, Exxon Mobil, Shell, BP, Chevron 
and ConocoPhillips, as defined by Jaffe & Soligo as ‘Big Five’, will be referred to as IOCs for 
the purposes of this paper, as mentioned earlier. These five companies make up 82% of the 
top 25 reserve holding private companies globally.48 Although one may argue that Total and 
ENI, as well as other companies which have a large international presence also are 
‘international’ oil companies, and rightfully so. However, as these two companies were 
relatively recently privatised, therefore made a transition from an NOC to an IOC, compared 
to the other five who have been IOCs for a longer period of time, the author feels that the Big 
Five represent a better sample of companies to contrast with NOCs. The companies in this 
sample are rather similar to each other in terms of their ownership type,  global scope, 
historical background and strategy, which allows for a generic IOC to be subjected to analysis 
rather than each company individually. 
In their study related to IOC investment & spending patterns, Jaffe & Soligo argue that the 
IOCs main futures ‘depend on their ability to develop giant oil and gas fields around the 
world’.49 Out of the three general types of oil companies, international, national and 
independent, it is especially the IOCs have the critical mass to realise efficiency and scale 
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economies of large oil fields. In fact, their size dictates that they do so, as most independents 
are better fit to develop smaller fields as they are not restrained by the high overhead costs 
that IOCs have. In fact, IOCs perform better in terms of operational efficiency than NOCs as 
well, in fields of similar size.50 It is precisely the lack of this type of oil prospects, where IOCs 
can be the most effective, that raises doubts about their ability to replace their current reserves 
and stay viable in the industry in the future.
In fact, the Big Five have an average reserve replacement ratio that is much lower than that of 
the next biggest 20 oil independents, 82% to 147%. This highlights the scarcity of profitable 
exploration prospects for IOCs. Jaffe & Soligo also argue, however, that the low replacement 
ratio also has a lot to do with how they use their profits, as IOCs under-invest in exploration 
of new reserves, instead using the profits mainly on development of current reserves and 
market operations such as share buybacks and dividends.51 
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4.2. Value Chain of the IOC
Let us now begin to dissect the elements that make up an oil company. In simplest terms, most 
oil companies segment their businesses in terms of the nature of the activity and where the 
activity takes place on the value chain. Although the business segments vary from company to 
company, depending on their reporting standards or the range of activities, a widespread 
terminology appears to be as such: Upstream, Downstream, Gas & Power, Chemicals, 
Corporate. However, due to the differences in the reporting standards, it is not always 
straightforward to compare aggregated data of one company to the other. For the sake of 
simplicity, we have used the segmentation standard used by Shell Plc (figure 4.1) while 
looking at the IOC business model. 
Figure 4.1, Source: Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2007, Annual Report and Form 20-F for the year ended December 
31, 2007 [online], www.shell.com, p. 2,  Available from: www.shell.com/annualreport [Accessed: 29.06.2008].
The firm is essentially an interplay of five broad segments. Exploration, development of oil 
resources and the production of crude oil is a part of Upstream, while transportation, refining 
and marketing of these resources constitutes the Downstream. In addition to these line 
business segments, there are also business segments that deal with the by-products, such as 
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Figure 4.2, 4.3, Source: Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2007, Annual Report and Form 20-F for the year ended 
December 31, 2007 [online], www.shell.com, p. 2,  Available from: www.shell.com/annualreport [Accessed: 
29.06.2008]. Margins and shares of income are 3-year averages between 2005-2007.
Gas & Power and Chemical. Finally, there is the Corporate segment which essentially gives 
support services to the line businesses.
While the profit margins and shares of income of each business segment can be seen in 
Appendix 4.b, what is worth noting here is the high margins in Upstream, reaching 29% 
between the years 2005-2007, and generating 52.5% of the net income for Shell Plc, 
compared to the Downstream operations, with a profit margin of 3.5% and generating 33% 
share of the net income, as illustrated in figures 4.2 and 4.3. Looking at these numbers, and 
similar numbers from other IOCs such as BP and Exxon Mobil, we may conclude that while 
Downstream is a low-margin, high-volume business, Upstream generates high margins and 
drives revenue growth. Supporting data may be found in the Appendix, 4.c to 4.d. 
Oil sands, included in the Upstream, while insignificant in revenue terms, appears to be a 
highly profitable business with an average 24% profit margin. It is important to note that the 
Upstream profits are buoyed by significant increases in the price of its output, crude oil, while 
Downstream essentially passes on the oil price increases to the consumer through the price of 
the gasoline. It is foreseeable that Upstream operations become even more profitable in the 
future as greater refining capacity is established around the world and the prices remain high. 
From this analysis, we may conclude that the real profit potential for oil companies, especially 
when crude oil prices are high, lies in upstream operation. Downstream operations merely 
serve as conduits for crude supply to meet consumer demand in the shape and form which the 
consumer demands. Hence, it would not be audacious to say that if IOCs stick with their 
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current business model, they would have to find ways to expand their upstream operations. 
Please see figure 4.4 for an illustration of the value chain. This is not happening right now. 
Some IOCs have seen prized, giant oil fields taken away from them by national governments 
to be handed to their respective NOCs, exemplified in the cases in Venezuela and Russia, and 
there are signs that fewer of these large contracts are coming their way. One exception to this 
trend may be Iraq, where the government has invited 36 oil companies to bid for contracts. 
Iraq holds the third largest oil reserves in the world, so it would certainly be a boon for IOCs, 
but it continues to be a challenging place to operate.
Figure 4.4, Source: Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2007, Annual Report and Form 20-F for the year ended December 
31, 2007 [online], www.shell.com, p. 2,  Available from: www.shell.com/annualreport [Accessed: 29.06.2008]. 
Margins and shares of income are 3-year averages between 2005-2007.
How, then, will the IOCs extract themselves out of this bind in their business model? There 
are different ways of coping with this issue. The companies will certainly keep pushing to 
replace their oil reserves, while pursuing opportunities in LNG. It is possible that they will 
accept lower stakes in joint-ventures (JVs) with NOCs, or act as contractors for big oil & gas 
projects without equity stakes. It is almost paramount that all IOCs invest heavily in 
36
technology development, in oil & gas extraction and refining technologies as well as perhaps 
alternative energy. This goes to the core of the issue, and these options will be laid out later on 
in the paper.
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4.3. Foundations of strategic capability
Strategic capability is defined as ‘the adequacy and suitability of the resources and 
competencies of an organisation, for it to survive and prosper’52. We shall distinguish between 
‘threshold resources/competencies’, which are required for the organisation to survive, and 
‘unique resources/competencies’, which give a competitive advantage to the organisation. 
Another dimension for resources is tangible/intangible divide, referring to the nature of the 
resource. Let us first take a look at the resources and competencies oil companies in general 
could have.
While it is possible for oil companies get access to some competencies through outsourcing, 
to oil services companies, for example, this would merely be compensating for a lack of 
strategic capability in that particular area. The analysis is done on the basis of the foundations 
of strategic capability framework described by Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, which can 
be seen in Appendix 4.e.
In this section, we aim to define the resources and the competencies that lead to strategic 
capabilities for oil companies in general. 
Resources
Access to the natural resource base
Access to resource base is perhaps the most crucial resource for an oil company. Exploration 
and production of crude oil is the most lucrative part of the business, with margins as high as 
29% for Shell. Without access to the resource base, the oil & gas reserves in the ground, E&P 
is not a possibility. Hence, access to the natural resource base is perhaps the most crucial 
resource for an oil company. Access to the natural resource base is a tangible threshold 
resource for the company, meaning that without it, operating would not be possible.
Access to financial capital
Although a company may have access to oil & gas reserves, it also needs to have access to the 
financial resources to extract these reserves. Oil & gas exploration is a high risk and capital 
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intensive activity, therefore it is difficult to raise enough debt at acceptable interest rates from 
financial markets. Hence, oil companies often need to on re-invest their profits to the 
business, or raise equity capital, and finance the projects themselves. An oil company without 
financial resources or the means to raise these resources simply can not perform E&P 
operations. Enough financial muscle is often a tangible threshold resource for the company, 
especially in E&P projects.
Access to human capital: recruiting for managerial and technical expertise
While the oil company may have the reserves in the ground and the cash in the safe, without 
the right expertise, both managerial and technical, operations may not be very profitable or 
sometimes even possible at all. Yet, most oil companies have human capital above the 
threshold level, even if not, the threshold level can be reached through recruitment of 
managerial and technical expertise. Hence, human capital can be considered an intangible 
unique resource for an oil company, as exceptional people can be a unique resource.
Political support from home country government
Political support from the home country is not a threshold resource, as oil companies often 
operate internationally without explicit support from their home country governments, 
however it can be an intangible unique resource if it exists. An example of this is the Chinese 
government’s support of its NOC, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), via aid deals 
linked to oil contracts, as seen in Nigeria.53
Access to markets
Although margins in downstream distribution networks, such as gas station networks, at 3.5% 
for Shell, for example, are not very significant, presence in this area gives IOCs a strategic 
resource. After all, these distribution networks are the access channels to the market. The 
financial value of market access may not be particularly high, due to low margins, but it could 
be a strategic asset. After all, rolling out new fuels, such as biofuels or even hydrogen, would 
be much easier when the company already has access to the market. As the existence of 
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independent oil companies show, access to markets is not a threshold resource, but it could be 
a tangible unique one.
Competencies
Conventional oil development technologies
Being apply to utilise conventional oil development technologies is a threshold competency 
for any oil company. If the company is unable to extract the conventional reserves it owns, it 
is difficult to say that it has operations in the first place. Oil services companies can be hired 
to enable newly formed oil companies to begin production, and move them above the required 
threshold.
Deep water drilling technologies
Deep water drilling technologies can be considered a unique competency, except for oil 
companies who only own deep water reserves, which is a rarity in itself. As the review of 
Exxon Mobil, Shell and BP’s resource bases in section 4 will demonstrate, most oil 
companies own some conventional oil fields to produce from already. Therefore, at the 
moment, we may consider deep water drilling as a unique competency which may lead to a 
competitive advantage. However, in the distant future, if oil companies were only able to 
make deep water finds, this could become a threshold competency.
Unconventional oil production technologies
Currently, unconventional oil production, such as oil production from oil sands or oil shale, 
can not be considered a threshold competency, as it is not a necessity for most oil companies 
to survive. As long as the oil prices remain high enough to justify the cost of this type of 
production, such technologies will provide a unique competency to the companies.
Renewable energy technologies
Having competency in some sort of renewable energy technology, such as solar, wind or 
biofuels is not a threshold competency, at the moment, however, it could be described as a 
unique competency. Competencies in this area are being developed by some of the IOCs, such 
as BP and Shell, but these projects are yet to show concrete business benefits for these 
companies. This does not mean, however, that this will be the case in the long-term, since 
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R&D is a long-term activity and building up technological competence in a new area will not 
create immediate value in the short-term.
Operational efficiency
Operational efficiency can be defined in many levels in an integrated oil company, in 
upstream, midstream or downstream operations, which all impact the bottom line. Efficiency, 
in every part of the value chain, has a different meaning. In upstream operations it is a 
question of exploration & production costs, for instance what are the costs associated 
extracting one barrel of oil - exploring, developing and exploiting the reserves at the lowest 
possible cost. As they are unable to significantly affect the crude oil price, the costs are the 
only variable under IOCs’ control to increase upstream profits. According to Boston 
Consulting Group54, two main factors upstream companies can control are improving 
recovery efficiency and reducing costs. Cost is a function of workload, productivity and factor 
costs. As it is possible for an inefficient organisation to survive during periods of high prices, 
as is the case for some NOCs, operational efficiency becomes a unique competency. Hence, 
higher operational efficiency, is a threshold competency while crude oil prices are low, and a 
unique competency while crude oil prices are high.
Project management expertise
Oil and gas development projects require a high level of project management expertise. 
Without such expertise, it is virtually impossible to develop large oil & gas fields, hence it 
should be considered a threshold competency for oil companies.
Strategic capabilities and competitive advantage
The following framework offers a comprehensive view of the strategic capabilities derived 
from the resources and the competencies the company has. The threshold capabilities are 
indispensable to oil companies simply for survival reasons, while capabilities for competitive 
advantage would allow them to outpace their peers. How the IOCs that are evaluated in this 
paper fare on these terms will be taken up in the IOC scorecard in section 5, Chapter 4.
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4.4. Review of the resource base and finances
A look at the resource base, finances, production, operational performance, geographical 
spread of operations and investment patterns of the IOCs is helpful in assessing recent 
performance and predicting future growth trends.
There are multiple way of looking at the issue. How much in hydrocarbon reserves does the 
IOC have? At what rate are they producing and bringing these to the market? How profitable 
is the operation? Can they replace the yearly reserves they deplete, through exploring new 
ones?
Firstly, let us begin by comparing the five companies in a rather uncomplicated way, through 
financial indicators. These numbers can be seen in the figure 4.5. Exxon Mobil leads the pack 
with nearly $390 billion in revenues in 2007, followed by Shell and BP. All companies 
experienced revenue growth, with Shell reporting over 11% growth in revenues in 2007, from 
the previous year. Exxon remained as the most profitable IOC, with $40 billion in profits. 
Financial 
performance
Overall revenue, $ 
million (2007)
Revenue growth from 
the previous year 
(2007)
Net income $ 
million (2007)
Net income % 
change (2007)
2007
Exxon Mobil
Shell
BP
ConocoPhillips
Chevron
390328 6,80% 40610 2,81%
355782 11,60% 31926 21,3%
288951 6,78% 21169 -5,0%
194495 3% 11891 -24%
214091 4,49% 18688 9,04%
Figure 4.5, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
Despite these impressive numbers, crude oil production growth was negligible, Chevron was 
the only IOC to have increased production by 1.3%, to 1,75 million barrels per day, as can be 
seen in figure 4.6. The rest of the Big Five actually suffered declines in rate of production, 
ranging from -2.4% (Exxon Mobil) to -12% (ConocoPhillips). This is testament to the impact 
Venezuelan nationalisation has had on IOCs, as most of the decline was due to production lost  
in Venezuela, even as the companies added production elsewhere. Natural gas production 
growth was just as disappointing, with only ConocoPhillips reporting a significant growth of 
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5% in 2007. When oil & gas production are lumped together in barrels of oil equivalent terms, 
overall production of all IOCs seem to have taken a hit, ranging from -1% (ConocoPhillips) to 
-5% (Shell).
Producti
on MBD, 
crude oil 
(2007)
Production 
% change, 
crude oil 
(2007)
Production  
MMCFD, 
natural gas 
(2007)
Production 
% change, 
natural gas 
(2007)
Overall 
thousands 
BOED 
production 
(2007)
Overall 
production 
% change 
(2007)
2007
Exxon Mobil 2616 -2,42% 9384 0,54% 4180 -1,35%
Shell 1818 -6,7% 8214 -1,8% 3234 -5%
BP 2414 -2,5% 8143 -3,3% 3771,00 -3%
ConocoPhillips 854 -12% 2292 5% 2324 -1%
Chevron 1756 1,39% 5019 1,27% 2619 -1,80%
Figure 4.6, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
Hence the disconnect between the companies’ record breaking financial performances and 
their operational performances. What accounts, then, for this disconnect? The answer is the 
crude oil price. Despite the existence of spot and futures gas markets in the U.S. and the U.K., 
the gas prices are closely correlated with the oil prices. As the crude oil price rocketed from 
around $20 per barrel in 2002 to over $140 per barrel in 2008, before falling to around $100 
per barrel in September 2008, and the IOCs raked in windfall profits. As a result, in 2007, all 
of the Big Five posted record profits despite a less-than-stellar operational performances.
Let us also take a look at the resource base, see figure 4.7. All of the Big Five have over 10 
billion boe in reserves, with Exxon Mobil standing out with 22.7 billion. Exxon Mobil has the 
biggest proved reserves, and the company has nearly 15 years of production left at the current 
rate despite producing more than any other IOC. One important measure indicating the health 
of the resource base is reserve replacement rate. That is the percentage of the newly added 
reserves to the reserves that are depleted during a year. ConocoPhillips did exceptionally well, 
with a replacement rate of 177%, while the other companies averaged around full replacement 
(100%). Companies with higher production rates will of course have to explore more reserves 
than the smaller ones to appear successful in this metric, hence Exxon Mobil’s 101% reserve 
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replacement appears still rather impressive compared to ConocoPhillips’ performance, as 
Exxon Mobil produces twice as much hydrocarbons as ConocoPhillips.
Proved 
reserves, 
BBOE 
(2007)
Proved 
reserves 
MB, fully-
owned, 
crude oil 
(2007)
Years of 
production 
left at current 
rate of 
production 
(2007)
Proved 
reserves 
BCF, fully-
owned, 
natural 
gas (2007)
Reserve 
replacement 
rate (2007)
Upstream 
capital 
investment 
, $ million 
(2007)
2007
Exxon Mobil 22,7 11074 14,9 68262 101,0% 15724
Shell 11,9 6686 10,1 31284 79,1% 14838
BP 12,5 5492 9,08 41130 98% 13906
ConocoPhillips 10,6 3104 12,5 22499 29% 11791
Chevron 10,78 7087 11,3 22140 11% 15538
Figure 4.7, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
The new reserves that are added are directly dependent on how much investment is made in 
upstream capital investment. This includes exploration, development and production. 
Exploring new reserves can be financially risky, however it is the best way for sustainable 
production growth. In 2007, Exxon Mobil invested the most capital in upstream, followed by 
Chevron and Shell. This is not surprising, since the company has added the most reserves. 
Jaffe & Soligo55 have noted that the IOCs are not investing enough in new reserve exploration 
and development.
Revenue & Net Income
When their shares of revenues are 
compared, the biggest, Shell and 
Exxon Mobil account for more than 
half of all Big Five revenue, as seen in figure 4.8. If BP, due to 
its difficulties with regard to its TNK-BP operation in Russia 
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which makes up about 25% of its production,56 loses its stake in this joint-venture, one may 
expect them to lose their third position. 
In terms of revenue growth, Shell has well outpaced its peers in 2007, with over 11% revenue 
growth, while ConocoPhillips has the most modest growth, at about 3%. It is also notable that 
the biggest revenue growth came from the three IOCs with the highest revenues. Figure 4.9 
shows the relative positions of the companies.
Figure 4.9, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
While all of the Big Five reported growth in revenues, BP and ConocoPhillips actually 
suffered negative growth in their net incomes. Exxon Mobil also reported a small increase in 
net income. Both ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil had lost reserves and production in the 
nationalization in Venezuela, which explains their poor performance. 
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Figure 4.10, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
On the other hand, BP, despite over 6% increase in revenues, reported a decrease in its net 
income, which can be explained mostly by its poor profit-per barrel figures. While the 
revenues grew in line with the oil prices, the profits declined relative to the previous year, due 
to increasing E&P costs and lower profit-per barrel for BP.
Figure 4.11, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
In terms of crude oil production, Exxon Mobil and BP clearly led the field in 2007, as it can 
be seen in figure 4.11. ConocoPhillips reported the lowest production numbers among the Big 
Five, again due to the Venezuelan dispute. In fact, only Chevron has managed to increase its 
crude oil production in 2007, by 1%, while the rest of the Big Five suffered production
declines between 2-12%, as seen in figure 4.12. In short, it is fair to say that none of the IOCs 
performed well on oil production metrics in 2007.
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Figure 4.12, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
On the natural gas front, Exxon Mobil again leads in terms of total production, while 
ConocoPhillips has the lowest production - less than a quarter of Exxon Mobil’s 2007 
production.
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Figure 4.13 - natural gas production
Production  MMCFD, natural gas (2007)
Figure 4.13, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
Despite having the highest production, hence the largest base to increase from, Exxon Mobil 
increased its gas production by less than 1%, compared to the previous year in 2007. 
ConocoPhillips recorded the best growth numbers, albeit from a much smaller base, with 5% 
increase. Meanwhile, Shell and BP had declining gas production, along with declining oil 
production, with declines of -2% and -3%.
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Figure 4.14 - change in natural gas production
Production % change, natural gas (2007)
Figure 4.14, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
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When the oil and gas numbers are put together in barrels oil equivalent terms, we get a 
glimpse of the overall production situation the Big Five is faced with. Exxon Mobil and BP 
have the highest production rates in BOE terms, followed by Shell, while Chevron and 
ConocoPhillips are ranked 4th and 5th, respectively.
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Figure 4.15 - oil equivalent production
Overall thousands BOED production (2007)
Figure 4.15, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
When the change in total production of the Big Five in 2007 compared to the previous year is 
analyzed, the results are hardly satisfactory. All of the Big Five had declining oil&gas 
production in 2007, with the declines ranging from -5% for Shell to -1% for ConocoPhillips. 
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Figure 4.16 - change of oil equivalent production
Overall production % change (2007)
Figure 4.16, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
While revenue growth has been impressive for all of the five IOCs, the fundamentals of their 
business, production numbers, remained weak. Of course, there were factors such as the 
Venezuelan dispute that affected some of the companies, and one could argue that this is 
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merely a short-term disruption. However, the long-term view is not more appealing either. 
Except for Exxon Mobil, Big Five companies do not have oil equivalent reserves to put them 
on par with NOCs. 
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Figure 4.17 - oil equivalent proved reserves
Proved reserves, BBOE (2007)
Figure 4.17, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
Neither are they successfully replacing their reserves. Below are the reserve replacement rates 
for the Big Five, calculated by looking at the difference between 2007 reserves and 2006 
reserves, adjusting by the production number and finding the annual reserve additions. The 
reserve replacement rate then reflects how much of the yearly production is replaced by new 
reserve additions. By this metric, Chevron appears to be the worst performer in 2007. The 
company’s total reserves in barrels oil equivalent terms declined to 10,7 billion barrels in 
2007 from 11,6 billion barrels in 2006. This decline, when the fact that the company produced 
946 million barrels of oil equivalent in 2007 is factored in, means that Chevron added 
reserves of 147 million barrels of oil equivalent in 2007. This corresponds to a reserve 
replacement rate of 11%, as seen in the table below.
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Figure 4.18 - reserve replacement rates
Reserve replacement rate (2007)
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Figure 4.18, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
Shortly, the replacement rates suggest stagnant reserve growth for Exxon Mobil and shrinking 
reserve bases for the other four companies. If companies stopped adding reserves in 2008, 
their current reserves would sustain their production at current levels for between 9 to 15 
years. The figure for individual companies can be observed in figure 4.19. Of course the 
companies will continue to add reserves, but it is highly questionable if they will add enough 
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RANKING Operational
Exxon 
Mobil
Shell
BP
Conoco 
Phillips
Chevron
Average
Exxon 
Mobil
Shell
BP
Conoco 
Phillips
Chevron
Average
Exxon 
Mobil
Shell
BP
Conoco 
Phillips
Chevron
Average
Oil Gas Overall (BOE)
Production Rank
Growth 
(%) Rank Production Rank Growth (%) Rank Production Rank Growth Rank
2616 1 -2,42% 2 9384 1 0,54% 3 4180 1 -1,35% 2
1818 3 -6,7% 4 8214 2 -1,8% 4 3234 3 -5% 5
2414 2 -2,5% 3 8143 3 -3,3% 5 3771,00 2 -3% 4
854 5 -12% 5 2292 5 5% 1 2324 5 -1% 1
1756 4 1,39% 1 5019 4 1,27% 2 2619 4 -1,80% 3
1892 -4,4% 6610 0,34% 3226 -2,4%
Financial
Revenue Profits Upstream CAPEX
Total ($ 
million) Rank
Growth 
(%) Rank
Total ($ 
million) Rank Growth (%) Rank CAPEX Rank
390.328 US$ 1 7% 2 40.610 US$ 1 3% 3 15724 1
355.782 US$ 2 12% 1 31.926 US$ 2 21% 1 14838 3
288.951 US$ 3 7% 3 21.169 US$ 3 -5% 4 13906 4
194.495 US$ 5 3% 5 11.891 US$ 5 -24% 5 11791 5
214.091 US$ 4 4% 4 18.688 US$ 4 9% 2 15538 2
288.729 US$ 7% 24.857 US$ 0,80% 14359,4
Reserves
Oil Rank Gas Rank Overall 
(BOE)
Rank Replacement 
(%)
Rank
Years of 
production 
left
Rank Average 
Ranking (1-5)
11.074 1 68.262 1 22,7 1 101 1 14,9 1 1,4
6.686 3 31.284 3 11,9 3 79 3 10,1 4 3
5.492 4 41.130 2 12,5 2 98 2 9,08 5 3,2
3.104 5 22.499 4 10,6 5 29 4 12,5 2 4,2
7.087 2 22.140 5 10,78 4 11 5 11,3 3 3,3
6.689 37.063 13,696 63,6 11,576
Figure 4.20, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual report 
(2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
reserves to replace their yearly production. This reality should be the harbinger of change for 
IOCs’ way of doing business.
Figure 4.19, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual 
report (2007), Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
In conclusion, we may say that although IOCs are doing well in financial terms at the 
moment, due to the high prices, but on the operational side their production rates are stagnant 
and reserve replacement rates are not impressive. Exxon Mobil does stand out as the best 
performer in the group, with the highest revenues, highest profit margin, highest net income, 
highest production, largest reserves, highest reserve additions and highest upstream capital 
investment. The numbers are somewhat skewed due to the production some companies 
(Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips) have lost in Venezuela, however nationalisation is an 
unfortunate reality of the oil industry that needs to be taken into account as a risk factor.
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Figure 4.19 - years of production left
Years of production left at current rate of production (2007)
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4.5 IOC Scorecard
After a review of the operational, financial and resource-related aspects of IOCs’ 
performance, we may rank these five IOCs in by taking the most important of these aspects 
into account. By taking such a holistic view, we may arrive at conclusions with regard to the 
competitiveness of Big Five IOCs compared to one another. Below is the IOC scorecard 
which ranks these five IOCs in terms of operational competency, financial results and 
resource base.
The results of such a ranking present us with a few conclusions. First of all, Exxon Mobil is 
the undisputed leader in the field, with an average ranking of 1,4. If one were to consider that 
2007 has been an unlucky year for the company due to Venezuelan nationalisation, it is quite 
possible that the company would be better placed in 2008. Exxon Mobil is undisputedly 
occupies the first tier in the group of Big Five.
After Exxon Mobil, the other three companies are rather close to one another, Shell, BP, and 
Chevron, ahead in some areas but not others. With average rankings of 3, 3,2 and 3,3 
respectively, these companies form the second tier in the Big Five.
Lastly, there is ConocoPhillips. As it is smaller in size compared to the others, and it was 
highly affected by the nationalisation in Venezuela, the company comes out as the weakest 
IOC on the scorecard. Despite the poor showing in 2007, it is highly likely that 
ConocoPhillips would be a part of the second tier in a better year.
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Chapter 5 - Strategic challenges of IOCs
5.1. The principal challenge:  Reserve replacement
The principal challenge that faces the IOCs today is reserve replacement. As discussed earlier, 
only a small fraction of the available oil resources is available for exploitation by IOCs, and 
their production in mature regions, such as the North Sea, is in decline.57 As IOCs are most 
competent in managing large scale exploration and production projects, the fact that they are 
getting locked out of these prospects will reduce their competitiveness. According to Jonathan 
Stern of Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, the IOCs’ main value proposition has been their 
capacity to handle large projects, large financial resources and technological edge. This value 
proposition is called to question today, as NOCs are able to finance projects themselves 
thanks to high oil prices, they can hire oil service companies such as Schlumberger for the 
technological expertise required and they have begun to build project management 
capabilities themselves.58
Therefore the main challenge is in reserves. IOCs have a mature reserve portfolio that is in 
decline, and they lack the means to add new reserves.
The Big Five reported a decline of 614,000 barrels a day in their oil output for the second 
quarter of 2008, despite a large profit of $44 billion. This decline was the steepest of the five 
consecutive quarters where output declined.59
This decline is only a symptom of the larger problem, lack of reserve access. The oil industry 
explains this as a trend called ‘resource nationalism’,60 as more and more nations exert direct 
control over their resources, they shut out IOCs from promising oil prospects. The Exxon 
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Mobil CEO and chairman, Rex W. Tillerson, has said that the problem with the supply is in 
essence a problem with accessing the resources on the ground for exploration and 
development. He refers to this as ‘a political question where governments have made 
choices’.61 Some companies, such as BP, ENI of Italy, and Total of France have put more 
emphasis on building good relationships with the governments of the countries they operate 
in. An example of this was ENI’s willingness to renegotiate its contracts in Libya.62
The IOCs themselves are not free of blame, however. As will be argued later on in the BP 
case, where this particular company’s record for the last 10 years is examined with regard to 
the relation of its share price to dividends & share buybacks, oil prices, reserve replacement, 
profits and other metrics, the IOCs have not been beyond the short-sightedness of boosting 
short-term share prices to the expense of investments. In 1994, the Big Five spent 3% of their 
‘free-cash’ on share buybacks and dividends, and 15% on E&P projects. By 2007, the picture 
was very different, with the companies spending 34% on share buybacks and dividends, and 
6% on E&P investment.63 As the case study will show, dividends are the biggest influence on 
the share price, and the IOCs, such as BP, have used them as tools, to a great effect. The 
opportunity cost in this case was diversifying into other areas, extracting more or technology 
development. In essence, IOCs efforts to keep their share prices high have damaged their 
future viability as businesses. Below is a comparison of the reserve life of the IOCs, both 
those within Big Five and others:
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From a purely financial point, there may be justification for this. If the company can not find 
prospects with higher rates of return than their own shares, they opt for share buybacks and 
paying dividends. However, from a strategic point of view, this is not a sustainable option. 
With declining reserves and production rates, the IOCs may be contributing to the high prices 
they enjoy at the moment, but their future business prospects become highly questionable. 
This principal challenge is compounded by issues that exacerbate its effects. 
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5.2 Resource nationalism and nationalisation - The Venezuelan case
As IOCs witnessed after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and many times since then in Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and finally in Venezuela, the threat of nationalisation is a very real threat 
to the international operations of these companies. The oil embargo of the 1973 paved the way 
for nationalisation of oil operations in many countries, as it did for Saudi Arabia.64 These 
nationalisation of IOC operations was the catalyst in the rise of NOCs, as companies such as 
Saudi Aramco inherited the physical infrastructure, technical and professional expertise from 
the former IOC and coupled these with direct backing from their national governments.  
During the 1960s oil exporting countries had sought to exert more control over their oil 
resources. Some countries, among them Iraq and Venezuela, forced out the IOC-consortiums 
through swift nationalisation processes, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, employed a 
process of gradual nationalisation.65
Mommer identifies three stages in the process of nationalisation.66 In the first stage, which is 
mainly associated with colonialism, the rent levels were low, oil concessions were extensive 
and contracts were as long as 60 years in duration. This represented an ideal situation for ‘the 
international tenant’, the IOC, and a less-than-ideal one for the landlord, the state. The 
contracts between the landlord and tenant were subject to international arbitration. The second 
stage is characterised by a gradual increase of the host country’s bargaining power, as the 
contracts were revised to bring their conditions in line with the standards applied in the United 
States. The effect of this revision was in fact a 50-50 split of the profits between the landlord 
and the tenant. This ratio was still unacceptable to oil exporting countries, as they were 
required to give up some sovereignty on fiscal matters, such as setting the tax rates, by fixing 
it to the contracts. Mommer argues that the ‘colonial spirit’ of the contracts remained intact in 
this case. Consequently, the third stage of the process began with the foundation of OPEC. As 
Mommer points out, the actions of the oil-exporting countries were becoming just as 
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internationally co-ordinated as those of the IOCs operating in those countries. With the OPEC 
Policy Declaration of 1968, the countries declared their sovereign right to extracting the 
maximum resource rent, also declaring nationalisation as the final objective. While the 
declaration welcomed foreign capital, it asserted that the activities would be under the 
supervision of the national government. Now let us look into two examples of 
nationalisations, first of Aramco in Saudi Arabia, and second the dispute between Venezuela 
and Exxon Mobil.
The Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) was founded in 1944 as a venture between 
Texas Oil Company (Texaco) and Socal, both U.S. majors of the time.67 Following the 1973 
embargo, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursued a policy of ‘increased participation’ in the 
Aramco venture, firstly through the increase of its minority stake in the company and later on 
through the placement of Saudi nationals to key positions within the organisation. Rather than 
engaging in an overnight nationalisation of the company, the government undertook a process 
of ‘incremental nationalisation’. According to the 1972 general agreement between Saudi 
Arabia and Aramco consortium, the state’s share of the company increased from 25% in the 
beginning to 51% by 1983. The final agreement was reached under the conditions that the 
kingdom would own a 60% share in the company, but would sell most of its oil back to the 
consortium partners to be marketed worldwide.68 This approach, undeniably due to the close 
relations of the company and the kingdom to the U.S., could be described as a more 
‘accommodating’ style of nationalisation.
In other cases, the transition process has not been as smooth. The example used here is U.S. 
based Exxon Mobil in Venezuela. In July 2007, Venezuelan government decided to embark 
upon the nationalisation of its oil industry by annexing foreign oil companies’ assets to its 
NOC, PDVSA.69  The president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, has largely tapped into PDVSA’s 
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cash flow to finance his social programs, spending over $13.3 billion in 2006, compared to 
the previous year’s $6.9 billion. The 2007 figure is in fact double the amount of investment 
PDVSA has made in oil and gas projects. Meanwhile, PDVSA planned to expand the 
country’s oil production from 2.4 million barrels a day to 5.8 million barrels a day. Most of 
the increase is due to come from heavy crude oil, which is not as profitable as lighter blends. 
The plan requires $77 billion investment, a third of it coming from foreign companies. It is 
unclear to outside observers how the company will achieve this goal as it lacks the financial 
means and has been in the epicentre of a difficult nationalisation.
President Chavez took office in 1998 and since then the country’s oil and gas regime has 
changed substantially. The imperative in these changes was to ‘reaffirm the national 
sovereignty over petroleum resources’ and, in essence, re-nationalise the sector. With 
legislation regarding hydrocarbons in 2001, foreign participation in oil exploration & 
production (E&P) activities is restricted to a minority stake.70
Since 1999, the Venezuelan oil output has declined 25%, as President Chavez has fired 20,000 
PDVSA employees, mainly experienced engineers and executives.71 In the 1990s, IOCs were 
welcomed into Venezuela to increase the extraction of the extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco 
Belt, a basin with estimated reserves of 235 billion barrels, and facilitate its refinement into 
lighter and more profitable blends.
In 2004, Venezuelan government began revising its contracts with IOCs, first raising the 
royalty rate from 1% of the value of oil extracted to 16.67%, and then to 33.3%. The income 
taxes have increased from 34% to 50% in the meantime.72 Since 1999, the Chavez 
government has implemented several changes in national legislation, requiring a majority 
government stake in all oil projects and began collecting large sums in taxes that were deemed 
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unpaid. In July 2007, the government compelled five IOCs operating in the country and 
Norway’s StatoilHydro to transfer equity stakes of 60% or more in four oil developments to 
the country’s NOC, PDVSA. Four companies complied, Chevron, BP, Total and StatoilHydro. 
The nationalisation of these assets also included two of Exxon Mobil’s ventures.73 While the 
others accepted, Exxon Mobil rejected the new deal and sold off one of its stakes to its partner 
Repsol YPF of Spain. At that point, Exxon Mobil continued to hold 41.7% stake in the Cerro 
Negro project, 120,000 bpd, and a 50% stake in the La Ceiba field.74 As these assets were also 
nationalised, the company pulled out of Venezuela instead of accepting the new terms. 
Following its exit, it began pursuing compensation from the Venezuelan government filing for 
international arbitration with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in 
2007 over the amount of the compensation. The arbitration process is deemed to be a long 
one, lasting for 5 years before a final decision has been handed. The company also filed 
lawsuits in the U.S., the U.K., and the Netherlands to freeze PDVSA assets.75 Following 
Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips also filed for arbitration. The conflict between the companies 
and Venezuela is focused on whether the companies should accept the book value of the 
seized assets or the market value, which could be higher. The companies claim to have 
invested more than $3.5 billion in Venezuela
In January 2008, Exxon Mobil won its lawsuits in the U.K. and the U.S., where the courts 
froze PDVSA’s assets of over $12 billion. It was argued that Exxon Mobil took this course of 
action to make sure PDVSA would pay the compensation.76 In response, Venezuela cut off oil 
supplies to Exxon Mobil. IEA and U.S. Energy department dismissed the influence of the 
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move, arguing that the cuts were very limited and Exxon would certainly be able to replace 
them from other sources.77 
The nationalisation of their assets in Venezuela has affected the performances of both Exxon 
Mobil and ConocoPhillips. In February 2008,  ConocoPhillips announced that its replacement 
rate for 2007 was only 29%, while Exxon Mobil reported 76%. When its expropriated assets 
in Venezuela are discounted, the company had added 249 million barrels of oil equivalent 
(boe) in 2007 over a production of 842 million boe. ConocoPhillips had lost over one billion 
boe in reserves in the Venezuela nationalisation. On the other hand, Exxon Mobil’s reserve 
replacement rate was 76%, as the company added 1.2 billion boe to its reserves in 2007.78 
These numbers clearly indicate that neither company can claim to be growing, as their 
replacement ratios are below 100%, but they also suggest that the impact of nationalisation on 
the companies has been substantial.
The recent example of the nationalisation of the Venezuelan oil industry is in stark contrast to 
the first example of Saudi Arabian nationalisation. In the latter case the foreign companies 
have been forced into accepting the new terms in a rather short period of time, through 
unilateral actions by the government. The host government was also not friendly with the 
companies’ home country governments, in contrast to the U.S. - Saudi relationship. The first 
case shows a more conciliatory and gradual approach to shifting the balance of power in the 
domestic industry away from IOCs, while the second case shows a radical shift in the political 
landscape of the host country, effectively pulling the rug under the foreigners’ feet. Both types 
of nationalisation pose a threat to IOCs operating in politically-risky countries, although the 
second type involves a much higher level of uncertainty.
When both cases are examined under the PESTEL framework, as seen in Appendix 5.d, it is 
clear to see in both cases the organisations have been affected by solely political factors in the 
countries they operate in. Aramco was outright nationalised, while Exxon Mobil and 
ConocoPhillips have taken substantial hits in terms of sunk investment costs and reserves lost. 
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The Saudi case mainly involved social welfare priorities, taxation policy and foreign trade 
regulations, as Saudi Aramco became a social actor after its take-over, it returned a larger 
share of the petroleum rent to the host country and the nationalisation was a part of long-term 
government policy in changing the regulations governing the oil industry. On the other hand, 
Venezuelan case appears to also possess a governmental stability dimension in addition to the 
factors mentioned earlier. Chavez government has radically altered the course of the country 
and has rapidly changed the regulatory environment. However Venezuela also suffers from 
political instability, marked by the highly contested election of 2006,79 declining oil 
production by PDVSA,80 and a lack of corporate transparency in the company’s affairs. Other 
examples such as changes in hydrocarbon regulations in Algeria and Bolivia81 should bring 
IOCs to a sobering realisation over the returns they should expect to make over investments in 
volatile countries.
To conclude, nationalisation is one of the big political factors that pose very real risks for 
IOCs in the countries they operate. How the companies may cope with that will be discussed 
further in chapter 6.
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5.3. Competition from NOCs
As mentioned previously, national oil companies present a part of the challenge to the future 
business prospects of IOCs. By definition, a NOC is a company in which a state or a state-
owned entity holds a controlling equity share.
NOCs can be divided into two groups: resource holding NOCs and resource seeking NOCs. 
The first group, resource holders, consists of NOCs from countries with large hydrocarbon 
reserves, such as Saudi Aramco of Saudi Arabia, Rosneft of Russia, or PDVSA of Venezuela. 
The second group, resource seekers, is formed by companies such as CNPC and CNOOC of 
China, Petrobras of Brazil and StatoilHydro of Norway. 
The resource holders enjoy clear advantages over IOCs, such as having easy access to 
reserves at home, which are often off limits to IOCs, such as the fields in Saudi Arabia or 
Venezuela. These NOCs come from producing nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela or 
Russia. This is due to the political support they have in their home country, where most of 
their reserves and production is located. As these ‘walled-gardens’ are closed to competition 
from other companies, the resource holding NOCs can operate without competitive pressures 
on reserve acquisition. The presence of these NOCs and governments that support them often 
make it impossible for IOCs to gain access to the resources in the respective countries, as it 
was pointed out earlier in the case of Venezuela. However, this production monopoly is 
limited by the reserves present in the home country. As these reserves are depleted, resource 
holders tend to become resource seekers, as is the case with StatoilHydro of Norway. 
The resource seeking NOCs, on the other hand, have relatively little hydrocarbons in their 
home country, therefore they seek to acquire reserves abroad. These NOCs come from mainly 
consuming nations, and the best example for this type of NOCs is perhaps CNPC of China. 
Backed by the Chinese government, CNPC has made investments in over 20 countries, such 
as Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Sudan, and Angola.82 These are countries that are also potential 
investment locations for IOCs. 
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According to a model by PFC Energy, a consultancy, the NOCs can be mapped in terms of 
their technological competence and resources. Within this framework, several groups of 
NOCs emerge in the picture. These are groups such as national resource holders (Saudi 
Aramco, Gazprom), entrepreneurial NOCs (Petrobras), and strategic resource seekers 
(CNPC). The diagram can be seen below:
Figure 5.1, Source: Hoyos, C. 2007, The new Seven Sisters: oil and gas giants that dwarf western rivals 
[online], Financial Times,  Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/471ae1b8-
d001-11db-94cb-000b5df10621,dwp_uuid=0bda728c-ccd0-11db-a938-000b5df10621.html [Accessed: 
08.09.2008].
The business newspaper Financial Times argues for the signs of the emergence of a new class 
of oil companies, not unlike the original ‘Seven Sisters’, the seven Anglo-Saxon oil 
companies that once dominates the oil industry, remembered by a phrase coined by Enrico 
Mattei, the founder of the Italian oil company Eni.83 The argument goes that seven NOCs will 
be overtaking the role of oil industry’s ‘rule-makers’, and relegate the IOCs to being ‘rule-
takers’. The new ‘Seven Sisters’ apparently would consist of Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), 
Gazprom (Russia), CNPC (China), NIOC (Iran), PDVSA (Venezuela), Petrobras (Brazil) and 
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Petronas (Malaysia). While selecting these companies, the metrics that were used were the 
size of resource base, size of the company’s output, its ambition, the involvement of the state 
in company’s affairs, and the impact of its deal-making and investments on other players in 
the industry.84
As the CPF framework shows, these companies are hardly the same in terms of resources and 
competencies. In fact, some of these companies would be unable to operate without support 
from an IOC or an oil service company. Such variety among the NOCs makes room for 
partnership opportunities for IOCs. 
What, then, are the competitive effects of NOC activity on IOCs? It is argued that NOCs limit 
investment opportunities for IOCs in their home countries, drive up the cost of investment in 
third-countries, push oil service prices higher, disregard geopolitical barriers IOCs face, and 
cooperate amongst each other, leaving IOCs out of lucrative developments. 
Firstly, one result of an active resource holding NOC would be limited investment 
opportunities for IOCs in NOC home country. The best examples of this are Venezuela, 
recently, and Saudi Arabia, beginning from the 1970s, as discussed in the section about 
nationalization.
Secondly, resource seeking NOC activity in third-countries that are potential investment 
locations for IOCs increases competition for resource access. An example of this was China’s 
CNPC getting preferential rights to four drilling licenses in Nigeria, the world’s eighth largest 
oil exporter, a deal linked with $4 billion worth of infrastructure investments by China in the 
country.85 This is a clear example of how government backing would benefit the NOC in 
getting access to resources.
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Thirdly, increased NOC activity pushes up the prices for oil services, such as renting drilling 
rigs, tankers, as well as the E&P personnel costs. As NOC demand for these services increase, 
the prices in the short term will follow. The changes in the client portfolio of Schlumberger, 
the biggest of the oil services companies, give an idea of the scale of the demand increase for 
its services by the NOCs. While the biggest portion of its clients is independent oil 
companies, the second largest – and the fastest growing – portion is NOCs.86 As a result, cost 
inflation for E&P activities has been an annual average of 25% from 2003 on a per-barrel 
basis until 2007, when the rate dropped to 15%.
NOCs are unhindered by barriers that apply to IOCs, such as sanctions or public outrage, as 
they are supported by the home country governments. An example of this is again CNPC. The 
company has invested in Sudan in 1995 when the country was still ravaged by a civil war, and 
IOCs were absent from the country due to the U.S. sanctions.87 While western companies, 
such as OMV, Talisman of Canada, and Lundin of Sweden pulled their investments from 
Sudan in the face of campaigns from human rights groups in 2002.88 CNPC has continued its 
activities there, and Sudan has gone on to become one of the large crude exporting countries 
to China. Financial Times argues that China’s willingness to accommodate regimes that are 
vilified by the West, such as Sudan’s, has given its NOCs access to reserves they would not 
have had otherwise.89
NOCs often cooperate amongst themselves, sometimes in deals brokered by home country 
governments, leaving IOCs out of the equation. Hence, NOCs investment decisions influence 
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the availability of investment opportunities for IOCs. In fact, a recent Ernst&Young report 
suggests that national oil companies may not be inclined to remain national at all.90 In fact, 
the value of transactions made by NOCs between 2003 and 2007 show a stark increase, with  
definite signs of the aforementioned Chinese investments. The chart below shows the NOC 
transactions outside of the NOC’s home market.
Figure 5.2, Source: Brogan, A. 2008, Are national oil companies the new international oil companies? [online], 
Ernst & Young,  Available from: http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/International/
Industry_Oil_and_Gas_Are_NOCs_the_new_IOCs/$file/Industry_Oil_and_Gas_Are_NOCs_the_new_IOCs.pdf 
[Accessed: 09.09.2008].
According to the same analysis, over half of the NOCs in the world have overseas operations, 
with the chart below demonstrating the extent of the companies’ operations, in number of 
countries operated in and size of reserves terms.
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Figure 5.3, Source: Brogan, A. 2008, Are national oil companies the new international oil companies? [online], 
Ernst & Young,  Available from: http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/International/
Industry_Oil_and_Gas_Are_NOCs_the_new_IOCs/$file/Industry_Oil_and_Gas_Are_NOCs_the_new_IOCs.pdf 
[Accessed: 09.09.2008].
One weakness of some NOCs is their lack of managerial and technical expertise, although this 
can not be said about companies such as StatoilHydro, Petrobras, Saudi Aramco or Petronas. 
Apart from these NOCs, almost all the others require some degree technical and managerial 
expertise, which they partly receive from oil services companies.91 
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5.4. Lack of incentive for long-term investment - BP Case
In this section, we will take a look at which factors affect the performance of the IOCs. As 
this paper argues for certain actions to be taken to improve performance, it is important to 
define what the performance is and how various variables contribute to it. The line of 
argument is: what directly decides company performance is not the oil price, which is an 
external factor, but how successful it is in adding new reserves. To demonstrate this point, a 
study of BP’s performance over the years 1999 – 2007 was done. As a starting point, we will 
take the share price of the company as the main measure of performance.
Why is share price an important measure of performance? In essence, it is the value the 
market assigns for the company, and the changes in this value over time tells us how well the 
company is doing. It is the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ that indicates how the investors 
collectively believe the company is performing.
The oil industry is notorious for having a clear cut boom-bust cycle. Oil prices increase, 
company profits soar, hiring increases, E&P equipment price increases follow. When the oil 
price begins to decrease, all these movements are reversed. It is unknown when the recent 
boom that began in 2002, when the crude oil price was at below $20/barrel, will end. 
Conventional wisdom would suggest that an increase in the price of crude oil would be 
coupled with an increase in the share prices of oil companies. The oil price is essentially the 
most important driver for the oil industry. Let us put these assumptions to test by analyzing 
how one of the big five IOCs, BP, fared over the course of the last nine year, from 1999 to 
2007.
From the outset, it appears that conventional wisdom is wrong in this case. When the trend of 
BP’s share price during the years 1999 to 2007 is compared to the development of the oil 
price during this period, we witness a steep increase in the oil price and yet a rather flat 
development in BP’s share price (see Appendix 5.a). In fact, when the data is more closely 
examined, one may see ‘odd’ years, such as 2004 and 2007, where the oil price is soaring 
(from $29/b to $38/b and from $54/b to $85/b, respectively) and the BP share price is 
drastically falling (from $529 to $439 and from $605 to $536, respectively). 
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Net income per BOE (barrel oil equivalent), which sums up how well the company is doing 
on a per barrel basis. What is important about net income per BOE measure is that it takes the 
current oil price and distills it through the organization machinery of the IOC, in the end 
showing only the value the machinery itself has created. 
Therefore we can claim that the conventional wisdom of an assumed correlation between the 
share price and the oil price is not correct. If there is an effect, it is not very large. Variables 
such as dividends, which have an immediate benefit for the investors, and net income per 
BOE, as a measure of performance, appear to have the biggest positive impacts on the share 
price. Out of these two variables, one of them is under direct control of the management – 
dividends. The management may decide to increase dividends to boost the share performance, 
regardless of the actual performance of the company. Net income per BOE, however, can not 
be increase on the whim of the management team. Therefore, net income per BOE is a reliable 
performance measure that we can use when measuring IOC performance in terms of E&P, 
certainly more so than the share price. As the oil price is different each year, let us see what 
the profit margin is and how it changes over time. This is done by calculating what percentage 
of the oil price equals the net income per boe.
 Net income per BOE Range of other oil majors Avg. Oil Price Cost of supply Margin
Year BP Minimum Maximum    
1999 4,17 2,80 3,91 17,01 6,40 24,51%
2000 8,61 5,85 7,99 27,13 6,40 31,74%
2001 7,51 5,31 6,82 22,73 6,40 33,04%
2002 6,04 5,07 6,26 23,49 7,30 25,72%
2003 7,95 6,32 8,24 26,92 8,68 29,53%
2004 8,4 7,31 10,81 34,54 9,54 24,32%
2005 12,51 9,74 15,32 49,60 10,44 25,22%
2006 11,91 11,24 16,96 60,32 12,51 19,74%
2007 12,62 12,35 17,14 69,19 11,91 18,24%
Figure 5.4, Source: BP Annual report (2007)
As a result, we may see the movements in BP’s E&P margin on a per barrel basis over the 
period of 1999-2007. The biggest margin is in 2001, but this is not a result of increase in the 
oil price, rather an internal issue, such as an increase in efficiency or cost cutting. From 2002 
on, it is possible to observe the substantial increase in the oil prices, while the net income per 
BOE stays almost the same. This may be due to increases in the tax burden placed on the 
company based on the oil price, or the increase in exploration and development costs, 
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summed up as ‘cost of supply’, which comprised of exploration costs, lifting costs and 
depreciation. In any case, it is clear that the company’s net income per BOE has not followed 
the increase in the oil price in lockstep.
Before clearing BP of charges of underperforming due to increasing costs, however, let us 
look at the rest of the oil majors. If there are some costs that are increasing industry wide and 
are unavoidable, such as taxes, this affects the other majors as well. The minimum and 
maximum net incomes per BOE amongst other oil majors are also available during this 
period. Between the years 1999-2001, BP appears to lead the industry in terms of net income 
per BOE, however, this does not continue from 2002 on, as the oil prices rise while BP’s net 
income per BOE stagnates. BP’s net income per BOE compared to other majors decreases 
over the years and converges towards the industry minimum. Aggregate net profits hide one 
reality. The company is not producing the same barrel of oil in a better way, it is producing 
just more of the same barrel. The result is that oil price does not correlate with the operational 
(or internal) performance of the IOC.
In conclusion, oil price, as an external factor, hardly has any direct impact on the company 
performance, whether it is the internal performance, which was measured by looking at the 
E&P value created, or external performance, which was measured by looking at the share 
prices of the company. However, there is an indirect impact of the oil prices on share 
performance, as windfall profits allow the management the option to increase the dividends 
and pass over the profits to the shareholders, hence boosting the share price. In fact, the 
periods where the share price decreased in the face of increasing oil prices, as in 2004 and 
2007, simply suggests that the investors did not expect any dividend increases as a result. We 
argue that the company’s performance is determined ultimately by how much of its reserves it  
can replace, or, in other words, how successful it is in adding new reserves. 
Valuation of IOCs by simply looking at the shareholder returns is a short-term view that will 
endanger the long-term profitability of these companies, however it appears to be the chief 
concern of the market at the moment. This reduces re-investment into the business via capital 
expenditure on E&P activities, as well as R&D and renewable energy development.
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5.5. Commoditizing technology
The oil industry is a technically complex industry, hence one would assume that the level of 
technology of a company can be a competitive advantage. Here, we will suggest that in the oil 
industry, technology has increasingly become a good that one can buy or outsource, rather 
than develop in a proprietary way, hence became commoditized. In the past, IOCs have 
benefited from being the sole entities that have the technology and capabilities to extract oil 
and gas, as host countries had to rely on their expertise to develop these natural resources. 
Today, IOCs no longer have a monopoly on this kind of technology and the technology has 
become commoditized to the point that significant competitive advantages can not be derived 
from it any longer.
Two trends have played a major part in this process. The first trend is the NOCs’ becoming 
more prominent, capable and competitive on the competitive landscape.92 The second trend is 
the oil service companies, such as Schlumberger, closing the technology gap and becoming 
capable of performing many tasks IOCs used to perform themselves.93 As a result of these 
trends, IOCs today do not have competitive advantages derived from technological 
capabilities in extraction of conventional oil, as most technology that they possess but the 
most cutting edge has become commoditized.
Let us examine the first trend. When IOCs used to have the exclusive know-how that the host 
countries needed for exploitation of their oil & gas resources, the NOCs were dependent on 
their services. If these services came with production sharing contracts, that was a price that 
had to be paid. Some NOCs have simply become more adept at extraction themselves, such as 
Petrobras of Brazil94 or StatoilHydro of Norway in deep-water and offshore drilling, for 
example.
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This trend is supported by a second trend, the oilfield services companies becoming more 
prominent, performing a wide range of drilling services with an international scope95, and 
closing the technological gap they have with IOCs during mid-1990s.96 The technological gap 
between likes of Schlumberger and likes of BP closed as IOCs invested less in technological 
innovation over the years and hired oil service companies, such as Schlumberger, to do the 
work. 
The research and development (R&D) spending by IOCs was slashed from its high levels in 
1980s due to stock market pressure, and the companies began focusing on the short-term. 
Short term shareholder return goals were emphasized at the expense of long-term production 
goals.97 The case study on BP shows that the market values dividends and return to the 
shareholders over the other variables. In such a situation, the company may decide, as it has in 
the IOCs in question, to prop up share prices in the short term through share buybacks and 
dividends. When it comes to long-term strategic decisions, such as R&D investment, the 
picture is not very complicated. Over the decades, IOCs responded to periods with low oil 
prices simply by shedding their oil services divisions and reducing R&D investment. The 
investment in R&D simply followed the boom-bust cycle associated with the oil prices. Due 
to job cuts in 1980s during the period of low oil prices, IOCs have severed ties with a 
generation of engineers and geologists.98 As a result, the median age of IOCs workforce is 
around mid-50s, according to the American Petroleum Institute.99
As a result, R&D spending by IOCs is lagging in percentage of revenue terms, compared to 
other industries. The three biggest of the Big Five, Shell, Exxon Mobil and BP respectively 
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spent $1.2 billion, $0.8 billion and $0.6 billion on R&D in 2007.100 While this was an average 
16% increase from the previous year, the amount remains miniscule, compared to the 
revenues of these companies, at 0.3%, 0.2% and 0.2% respectively. Please see the R&D 
expenditures in absolute and relative to revenue terms below: 
Figure 5.6, Source: Crooks, E. 2008, Oil innovation after years of 
caution [online], Financial Times,  Available from: http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
d39b8088-5cc9-11dd-8d38-000077b07658.html [Accessed: 
02.09.2008].
These rates of R&D spending are hardly comparable to the levels in other companies, such as 
technology companies (15%) and even automotive companies (4%).101 Schlumberger, the 
largest oilfield services company, spent 3.1% of its revenues, or $0.7 billion, on R&D in 2007, 
outspending all IOCs except for Exxon Mobil, Shell and Total in absolute terms.
Clearly, IOCs do not have a strong record as innovators, and individually, the picture is also 
bleak. In fact, as IOCs tended to cooperate in R&D in areas such as drilling technologies, they 
do not have distinctive technologies from one another. Hence, both in absolute terms and 
relative to one another, IOCs hardly have a technological edge. As companies such as 
Schlumberger begin to possess more advanced drilling and extraction technologies than IOCs, 
these companies will lose one of their competitive advantages.
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5.6. Geopolitical risks associated with geographical spread of operations
An important factor for oil companies, as in all businesses, is where they choose to invest 
their money. In the resource extraction business, this becomes even more critical. The 
landlord states have de facto sovereign rights over the companies’ raw materials, and they 
possess the ability to make life quite difficult for IOCs, as experienced by almost all IOCs. 
Examples of this are BP’s troubles in Russia with their TNK-BP venture, Shell’s experience in 
Sakhalin II in Russia, again, and Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips and StatoilHydro in 
Venezuela. The last case is examined later on in the paper, in Chapter 6. Therefore we shall 
examine the geographical spread of the IOCs’ production, reserves and capital expenditure. 
Our main concerns will be whether the mix is diversified enough, and to a greater degree, 
how much of this mix is in higher risk countries. While current production, or the loss of it, 
for that matter, affects the IOC in the shorter term, having reserves in a certain country 
indicates a longer term commitment, hence with longer term effects. 
While assessing the risk associated with the respective regions, the data from Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) with regards to governance quality will be used.102 This 
methodology uses data from sources such as the World Bank, Freedom House, UNESCO and 
Fraser Institute, among others, and compiles it to rank countries with regards to Democratic 
Participation, Government and Economic Efficiency, Accountability, Human Rights, Political 
Stability and Rule of Law. As the ranks in each area tend to be correlated, we shall use the 
averages of these numbers to assess the risk associated with the operations of the IOC in a 
particular region. CIFP ranking scores countries between 1 and 8, with a high score of +6.5 
indicates that a country is performing comparatively poorer, while a score between 1 and 1.35 
indicates that the country is performing well. Scores between 3.5 and 6.5 suggest varying 
degrees of performance around the global mean. The averages derived from country based 
analysis of CIFP can be seen in Appendix 5.b.
Following is an assessment of the geographical spread of the three largest of the Big Five 
IOCs activities, Exxon Mobil, Shell and BP:
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5.6.1 Exxon Mobil 
According to Exxon Mobil’s annual report for 2007, the company has its largest share of 
production from Africa, narrowly followed by the Americas region, each region contributing 
about 27% of the oil production. Europe and Asia Pacific/Middle East regions follow, with 
approximately 18% each. 
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ExxonMobil Geographic production mix (2007)
Figure 5.7, Source: Exxon Mobil annual report (2007)
Meanwhile, company’s largest reserves are in Asia Pacific/Middle East and the Americas 
accounting for 36.5% and 27.3% of the company’s reserves respectively. Overall, both the 
company’s oil production and oil reserves are sufficiently diversified in a geographical sense, 
with no region accounting for more than 30% of the entire mix. Top two regions in terms of 
crude oil production constitute over 55% of the total production. In terms of gas production 
and reserves, the story is different. Russia/Caspian region dominates the gas reserves held by 
the company, with almost 38% of holdings being in this region. It is followed by Asia Pacific/
Middle East region, with almost 30%. 
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ExxonMobil Geographic reserves mix (2007)
Figure 5.8, Source: Exxon Mobil annual report (2007)
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We may conclude that although Exxon Mobil’s oil production and reserves are well 
diversified, its gas operations are heavily reliant on two regions, Russia/Caspian and Asia 
Pacific/Middle East.
So, how relevant are these degrees of diversification relevant in terms of business risk? By 
using the CIFP data, let us look at the country risk Exxon Mobil carries due to its geographic 
production and reserves mix. 
Exxon Mobil Risk rating (1-6) % production Short-term risk % reserves Long-term risk
Europe 3,52 0,18 0,63 0,16 0,56
Americas 4,21 0,27 1,14 0,27 1,14
Asia Pacific/Middle East 5,29 0,19 1,01 0,36 1,91
Africa 5,91 0,27 1,60 0,10 0,59
Russia/Caspian 6,15 0,07 0,43 0,08 0,49
Total risk 4,80 4,69
Figure 5.9, Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 2007, Country ranking table 2007 [online],  
Available from: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/gdp_ranking.php [Accessed: 06.08.2008].
With a simple calculation that takes into account what proportion of the company portfolio 
corresponds to what risk rating, we arrive at a short hand for the degree of geopolitical risk 
the company is exposed to. As the CIFP data is on a per country basis, if there is a high 
variation between ratings, for instance the U.S. having a lower risk rating compared to 
Venezuela, the countries have been weighted by the total oil production in the region. In other 
cases, such as Europe or Africa, where the variation is little, simple averages have been taken. 
Since changes in production affect the company in the short term, this forms the basis for 
short term risk calculation, while changes in reserves, which will be extracted in the future, 
forms the basis for long term risk calculation. A similar analysis was made for the other two 
companies, Shell and BP as well.
Russia, due to Exxon Mobil’s high dependency on the country for its gas reserves, and the 
country’s relatively high risk status, could pose risks for the company. The company has 
already suffered the loss of its export rights to Asia Pacific from Sakhalin I project due to 
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pressure from Gazprom and the Russian government.103 In the long-term, its portfolio’s 
dependency on Russian gas reserves may spell further problems for Exxon Mobil’s gas 
production. 
It is important to note that the company has also suffered the loss of its assets in Venezuela, 
which is discussed in Chapter 5, which could suggest that its reserves and production in the 
Americas, and Africa, may pose risks as well. However, when compared to both BP and Shell, 
Exxon Mobil has lower short-term and long-term risks, but not to a substantial degree.
In 2007, Exxon Mobil invested over $6 billion in Asia Pacific/Middle East, and $5.2 billion in 
the Americas, which suggest that these regions will lead production and reserve growth.
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Figure 5.10, Source: Exxon Mobil annual report (2007)
Although there are some restrictions to this analysis due to the company’s grouping of its 
global regions, for instance putting Venezuela and the U.S., two very different countries, in 
the same region, overall it provides for a useful review of the resource portfolio and the 
country risks associated. Please see figure 5.13 for details.
5.6.2 Shell
The geographical spread of Shell operations can be found in Appendix 5.c. Shell classifies its 
regions differently than Exxon Mobil, separating the U.S. and non-U.S. Americas, while 
lumping together Middle East, Russia and CIS countries. Venezuela is also reported 
separately, although the company had to leave the country due to nationalisation.
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One curiosity of the Shell reporting system is that the company does not distinguish between 
oil and gas production, but lumps them together in billion barrel oil equivalent (BBOE) terms. 
Middle East, Russia & CIS leads the pack with 24,23% of the crude oil & natural gas 
production, followed by Europe with 23,14%. Together the top two regions account for 47% 
of total Shell crude oil production. 
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Figure 5.11, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007)
In terms of reserves, one-fifth of Shell crude oil & natural gas reserves lie in Middle East, 
Russia & CIS, and 38% is jointly owned with other entities (equity affiliates), the rest of the 
reserves are equally dispersed. All in all, Shell has a geographically well diversified portfolio, 
both in production and reserve terms, although the size of the reserve portfolio that is held by 
equity affiliates may be cause for concern, as these may be under greater risk than a fully-
owned subsidiary, as BP has found out in its TNK-BP joint venture in Russia.104
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Figure 5.12, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007)
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How about the country risks associated, then? When CIFP data is reconfigured to fit Shell’s 
regional reporting structure, we see that the most important region for Shell, holding 24% of 
its production and 20% of its reserves, is a composite of some of the riskiest countries in the 
world, Middle East, Russia & CIS. Yet the company also has large interests in Europe, and a 
large production in the U.S., which is beneficial for the overall portfolio. Venezuela was high 
up on the risk scale, and Shell had to leave the country in 2007 due to the nationalisation of 
the oil industry there.
Shell Risk rating (1-6) % production Short-term risk % reserves Long-term risk
The U.S. 3,18 0,17 0,54 0,70 2,23
Europe 3,52 0,23 0,81 0,13 0,46
Asia Pacific 4,62 0,12 0,55 0,09 0,42
Non-U.S. Americas 4,76 0,03 0,14 0,03 0,14
Africa 5,91 0,18 1,06 0,07 0,41
Venezuela 6,02 0,04 0,24 0,00 0,00
Middle East, Russia, CIS 6,23 0,24 1,49 0,20 1,25
Total risk 4,85 4,90
Figure 5.13, Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 2007, Country ranking table 2007 [online],  
Available from: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/gdp_ranking.php [Accessed: 06.08.2008].
Shell makes its biggest capital expenditures in the U.S., followed by Middle East, Russia & 
CIS. It should be noted that these capital expenditures include not on E&P but also on 
downstream operations such as refining.
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Figure 5.14, Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007)
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Overall, Shell is better positioned in terms of risk than Exxon Mobil, as it has more 
diversified production and reserves, with a substantial part of its investment portfolio in low-
risk regions, such as the U.S. and Europe. Also, it is worth noting that despite higher total 
risk, the company’s better diversification alleviates the risk burden. However, the company’s 
rather large share of reserves are held jointly with equity affiliates, which may be cause for 
concern.
5.6.3 BP
Please see Appendix 5.c for the details of BP’s geographical operations spread. According to 
the analysis, the biggest ‘region’ in terms of production is equity affiliates, which are BP’s 
joint ventures in a number of countries, most prominent of them being TNK-BP in Russia, 
with a quarter of BP’s production and a third of its reserves coming from this venture.105 This 
is followed by the U.S., with over 21% share of production, and Asia Pacific, with just under 
10%. From this picture, it is clear to see that BP does not have a very diversified production 
portfolio, with nearly 50% of the production coming from two sources: the U.S. subsidiary 
and TNK-BP in Russia. 
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Figure 5.15, Source: BP annual report (2007)
The picture is quite similar in terms of reserves, with 31% oil and 34% of the gas reserves in 
the U.S. and about 45% of oil and 9% of gas in equity affiliates. Non-US Americas region 
also holds one quarter of the gas reserves, but the portfolio overall is rather lopsided. 
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Figure 5.16, Source: BP annual report (2007)
The large portion of BP’s portfolio that is held jointly with other parties is definitely cause for 
concern, especially in light of the episode that has unfolded with TNK-BP in Russia. Let us 
now look at the risk profile of BP’s regions according to the CIFP rankings:
BP Risk rating (1-6) % production Short-term risk % reserves Long-term risk
UK 2,76 0,08 0,22 0,05 0,14
US 3,18 0,21 0,67 0,31 0,99
Rest of Europe 3,50 0,02 0,07 0,02 0,07
Asia Pacific 4,62 0,10 0,44 0,10 0,46
Non-US Americas 4,76 0,03 0,16 0,03 0,14
Africa 5,91 0,07 0,41 0,06 0,35
Russia - JV 6,16 0,49 3,02 0,43 2,65
Total risk 4,99 4,80
Figure 5.17, Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 2007, Country ranking table 2007 [online],  
Available from: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/gdp_ranking.php [Accessed: 06.08.2008].
While the large portion of production and reserves in the U.S. and in Europe reduce BP’s 
exposure to political and institutional risk, their engagement with many joint ventures, 
especially TNK-BP in Russia, increases their risk. Out of all the Big Five, BP is the only one 
that has staked so much of its production and reserves in equity ventures, and those in 
especially risky regions such as Russia. Compared to BP’s 45% of oil reserves and production 
being in equity affiliates, these numbers are 5% and 28% for ConocoPhillips, 12% and 34% 
for Chevron respectively. Shell only reports percentage of oil reserves held jointly, not 
production, which is rather high as well, 38%. Exxon Mobil does not report an equity 
affiliates segment.
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Overall, BP’s reserve portfolio is not very diversified. Despite having low-risk regions such as 
the U.S. and Europe substantially contribute to its portfolio, BP is exposed to business risks 
due to having staked almost half of its production to equity affiliates. This risk is compounded 
by the fact that some of these affiliates are in regions that are far from applying the rule of 
law, such as Russia. In fact, if BP loses its stake in TNK-BP due to the shareholder dispute, 
some of this risk would be realised, which would indeed be a serious blow to the company.
Although all three companies, on average, carry similar amounts of risk, their portfolio 
compositions are different, which suggests that the risks they are exposed to will be different. 
While BP is vulnerable in Russia with its equity affiliates, Exxon Mobil has risks related to 
instability in Africa, while Shell also assumes a high risk burden in Africa and CIS. Overall 
risks might not appear very different, but Shell has diversified its stakes to a larger degree 
than the other two.
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Chapter 6 – New strategic directions for IOCs
Changing the game
The concluding chapter of this paper will borrow concepts of game theory to propose a new 
strategic paradigm for international oil companies. While doing so, the industry and its 
dynamics will be described as ‘a game’, and the actors in it, as ‘players’. The value of this 
approach is to lay bare the dynamics of the industry and IOCs’ role in it. 
In the previous chapters, a game where odds were mostly stacked against IOCs was described.  
The oil industry is an extractive one, and by nature, those who have access to the resource will 
prevail. As this paper has demonstrated, IOCs no longer have extensive access. What is a 
multi-billion dollar enterprise to do, then, if it is to be deprived of the very resource that 
brought it to being? By borrowing insights from game theory, Chapter 6 will seek to answer 
this question.
An insight from studying game theory is that, in a game, it often can be difficult or impossible 
to act rational and attain satisfactory results at the same time. The prisoner’s dilemma is an 
example where perfectly rational decisions lead only to second-best results. In order to 
improve its results, the game as a whole has to be changed. The results of changes in a game 
can be substantial. For instance, turning the one-round prisoner’s dilemma into a repeated 
game, therefore increasing the interaction between players, can lead to much better results.106 
According to Brandenburger & Nalebuff 107, it is possible for a company to improve its 
competitive position in a game by changing the elements that make up the game. In order to 
find ways for changing a game, the value net is suggested as a tool for the analysis of 
interdependencies and various roles of players in a game. After this analysis, the five elements 
of the game should be examined. These are players, added values, rules, tactics, and scope, or 
short PARTS. These describe all the interactions in a game. In order to change the game, one 
or several of these elements have to be changed. In the element players, all the players in the 
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game with their particular roles are examined. Added values analyses how own added values 
in the game can be increased and/or those of other players can be decreased. Rules in a game 
may possibly be changed or adapted. What tactics are applied by the players in the game and 
what are the underlying motivations and effects on perception? Scope discusses what are the 
boundaries of the game could be. The assessment of these elements should unearth ways in 
which a game may be changed, to the benefit of the player in question, and sometimes, to the 
benefit of all players. The assessment may suggest a need for substantial change and even 
include drastic solutions such as industry exit.108
Let us now borrow from another game theorist. Axelrod109 also approached the problem of 
changing games and suggested a three step approach which aims at transforming a game such 
that for other players co-operation becomes more desirable than defection. He suggests that 
co-operation can be promoted by making the future more important relative to the present, 
changing the payoffs of the players and teaching the players values, facts and skills that 
promote co-operation.
Enlarging the shadow of the future is one way to increase the incentives to co-operate. If the 
future is important relative to the present, a player can use an implicit threat of retaliation in 
case another player defects. The TIT FOR TAT strategy, for example, where the player begins 
with co-operation and thereafter simply mirrors the actions of his opponent, to handle the 
prisoner’s dilemma is an example for how this approach works. In practice, there are two 
basic ways in which the shadow of the future can be enlarged. First, by making interactions 
more durable, e.g. when two firms engage in a strategic alliance, and second, by making 
interactions more frequent and thereby making future retaliation more relevant for the present. 
This is the case when two firms are doing business other on a regular basis. 110
86
108 Brandenburger, A.M. & Nalebuff, B.J. 1996, The right game: using theory to shape strategy, p.59, Harvard Business 
Review.
109Axelrod, R. 1984, The evolution of cooperation: how to promote cooperation, pp. 124, New York Basic Books / 
(2006) Revised edition Perseus Books Group.
110Axelrod, R. 1984, The evolution of cooperation: how to promote cooperation, pp. 126, New York Basic Books / 
(2006) Revised edition Perseus Books Group.
Another way of promoting co-operation in a game is to change the payoffs of the game. In a 
changed prisoner’s dilemma in which the cost of defection is higher than its payoff, prisoners 
would not defect. In order to increase the incentives for players to co-operate it is necessary to 
increase the payoffs in the long-run such that short-run defection does not pay off. For 
example, a firm might coax another firm into co-operation by announcing the possibility of 
future business.111
Teaching players to care for each other is another way Axelrod suggests in order to promote 
co-operation. Through co-operation firms can attempt to transfer their values and attitudes to 
other firms. Also altruistic behaviour may be beneficial as such behaviour tend to be 
reciprocated by others. However, the risk of being exploited has to be handled carefully. 
Axelrod also mentions teaching reciprocity as a key element for promoting co-operation. In 
practice, firms could e.g. embark on exchange programs or team building activities and the 
like.112
Therefore we are now in possession of two related tools to make suggestions towards how 
IOCs can change the game in their favor. Firstly, let us analyze IOCs’ value net and make 
suggestions based on PARTS. Afterwards, building on this analysis, we shall conclude with 
linking back to Axelrod’s suggestions for changing the game.
6.1. The value net for IOCs
According to Brandenburger & Nalebuff’s value net113, a map representing all the players in 
the game and the interdependencies between them, there are five main groups of players in a 
game of business. These are customers, substitutors, complementors, suppliers and of course 
the company that connects all these. The schema of the value net can be seen in Appendix 6.1. 
Then, step by step, let us now create the value net of the IOC.
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Firstly, let us begin with the company. The game of business is all about value, so what is the 
value that the IOC represents? The value added by the company is carried via the products the 
firm produces, as the technology, resources and competencies of the company are used to 
create these products. These products are mainly in five categories, for five distinct types of 
customers. These are gasoline, for vehicle owners and drivers, crude oil, for refineries, jet 
fuel, for aviation, fuel for power generation and oil-based chemicals for industrial businesses. 
By defining these products, we have also defined some of the customers IOC has. Examples 
are drivers, refineries, airlines, manufacturers and utilities companies. These customers of 
course have the option of buying the mentioned products from others that supply them. These 
are the substitutors of the IOC, that either sell to the same groups of customers, hence 
substitutors with respect to customers, or buy from the same groups of suppliers, hence 
substitutors with respect to suppliers.114 Amongst these substitutors are other IOCs, NOCs, 
independent oil companies, renewable energy start ups, and nuclear energy companies. The 
suppliers group, on the other hand, is made up of players that supply goods or services to the 
IOC. This group is made up of players such as oil services firms, resource holding states, 
other IOCs, NOCs, independent oil companies, or shipping companies. The last group of 
players in the game are the complementors, players which either sell products complementary 
to those of the IOC to the same groups of customers, or which buy complementary goods or 
services from the same groups of suppliers. In this group are other IOCs, NOCs, independent 
oil companies, auto manufacturers, aerospace manufacturers or utilities. Some of these, such 
as auto manufacturers, are complementary with respect to the customers, they build and sell 
the cars which use the gasoline produced by the IOC. Some others, such as other IOCs, 
substitutors in other cases, are complementary with respect to the suppliers, for example 
towards tanker owners or oil services firms that they employ.
Building on these insights, the value net for the IOCs can be seen in figure 6.1. Meanwhile, in 
the green boxes on the diagram, one can see the changes that can be made to the game to 
make the competitive situation more favorable towards the IOCs. These will be discussed 
next, after which these insights will be brought together with Axelrod’s suggestions for 
changing the game.
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Figure 6.1, Source: Brandenburger, A.M. & Nalebuff, B.J. 1996, The right game: using theory to 
shape strategy, p.59, Harvard Business Review.
Now that the value net has been established, now the question is how does one change it? The 
PARTS framework suggests that one can either change the players in the net, their added 
values, the rules of the game that is being played, the perceptions of the players (via tactics) or 
the scope of the game. Let us begin with players.
6.1.1. Players
Partner with complementors, such as auto manufacturers, aerospace industry or utilities 
companies. This will pool R&D resources of IOCs and their complementors, therefore 
enhancing their unique competencies in the field of new fuel technologies. Examples of this 
were seen when BP partnered with General Motors to develop a hydrogen fuel cell, discussed 
in more detail later on.115
Another option with regards to players is to acquire suppliers, such as oil services companies, 
therefore increase IOCs’ added value in the value net as well as their leverage over NOCs who 
use oil services companies. This will create new E&P competencies for IOCs, reversing the 
long trend to outsource oil services. It is also conceivable that several IOCs jointly buy an oil 
services firm, in order to lock up its services exclusively. Exxon Mobil, BP and Shell jointly 
buying an oil services firm such as National Well could increase their added value as players, 
both due to additional competencies and due to the fact that NOCs can no longer avoid them 
while drilling. Joint ownership would mean that all the owners have access to the services, but  
it would make the financing of such a deal easier.
6.1.2 Added Value
The surest way to increase IOCs’ added value is through increasing spending on research and 
development in two areas, developing new competencies in resource extraction and creating 
new resource options, through renewable energy development.
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Unconventional oil
Firstly, these firms should cultivate unique competences on unconventional oil production and 
deep-water drilling. This will allow IOCs to increase their added value in the value net. 
Firstly, let us look into the ways of unconventional oil production.
The oil sands in Canada, according to a report by Ernst&Young, may represent 50% of the 
accessible reserves in the world for IOCs. Besides the obvious ease of access to the resource, 
other benefits include proximity to the world’s biggest oil consumer, the U.S. and the size of 
the reserves, estimated to last between 30 to 50 years.116 Drawbacks, however, are the high 
capital and operating costs, and the risk of the oil price going down, as well as a large carbon 
footprint and need for technological advances. Hence, oil sands present IOCs with high 
economic and technological risks, and their development is dependent on the oil price 
remaining high. In the long-term, the development costs may go down due to technological 
advances, however, a sustained period of high prices is first necessary.
Reduce costs
Reducing costs is another way of increasing the added value of the IOC. Having lower costs 
overall would allow IOCs to be better positioned to operate in high-cost environment like 
those of unconventional oil & gas and deep water drilling. According to a report by BCG, the 
cost for the E&P division of an oil company is in essence a function of workload, productivity  
and factor costs. Internal process improvement and efforts to reduce factor costs will allow 
IOCs to increase their added value in this respect.
Pull the right levers to reduce costs
Cost = Workload x Productivity x Factor costs
Examples = # of wells drilled
# of visits to the platform
# of well jobs done
# of perforation runs
Material
Manpower
Equipment
Manpower
Goods
Services
Equipment
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Pull the right levers to reduce costs
Levers = Eliminate unnecessary activities
Prioritize work
Conduct post-mortems
Institutionalize feedback loops
Redeploy resources
Reduce rework
Automate
Simplify
Work in parallel
Delegate
Outsource
Broaden supplier base
Broaden design specs
ʻDown-specʼ
Source: Boston Consulting Group 2007, BCG Focus: Maximizing value in upstream oil and gas, Boston 
Consulting Group, Inc.
Developing renewable energy sources
Another way to increase the added value of the IOC is to develop alternative, renewable 
energy sources. It will also reduce IOCs’ strategic dependency on oil & gas reserve access in 
the long-term.In this respect, how is the activity by IOCs in this field? By 2006 numbers, the 
investment is not significant. A quick rundown of the IOCs’ activities is given below:
 Company
CAPEX 
(2006)
Renewable 
energy 
investment Period Policy focus
Exxon Mobil $19.9 billion $100 million N/A
Does not consider it commercially viable. 
Investment in Stanford University.
Shell $23.1 billion $1.25 billion
1999-20
06 Wind power  biofuels
BP $16.9 billion $900 million
1999-20
06 Solar power biofuels, wind power
Chevron $16.6 billion $200 million
1999-20
06 Geothermal power
ConocoPhillips $10 billion Not available N/A Biofuels
Figure 6.1, Sources: The Guardian 2008, Heavyweight investors join Rockefeller rebellion at ExxonMobil 
[online], The Guardian,  Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/may/22/exxonmobil.oil 
[Accessed: 08.09.2008].
Reuters 2007, Oil majors" investments in renewable energy [online],  Available from: http://
www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/20070403-0403-environment-oilmajors-renewables.html [Accessed: 
08.09.2008].
In recent years, shareholders of IOCs have begun to call on the companies to invest more in 
renewables, but this has not produced visible results. One example of this is was the 
Rockefeller family, who are the longest standing shareholders of Exxon Mobil, calling on the 
other shareholders to support a shareholder resolution that separates the roles of CEO and 
chairman, so that the chairman may focus on the long-term, strategic questions that face the 
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company, primarily the issue of diversifying into alternative energy sources. The resolution 
also called for Exxon Mobil’s adoption of a ‘Renewable Energy Policy’ to focus on renewable 
energy development, research and sourcing.117 However, this resolution was defeated at the 
annual shareholders meeting, with the management arguing its case that the company has had 
its best year so far with $40 billion in profits.118
It is often argued that IOCs do not have the skills or the will to invest and succeed in the 
renewable energy business, as they are too large, not responsive enough and lack the 
entrepreneurial flair that is necessary in this sector.119 Shareholders, on the other hand, 
emphasize the need for evolution of these companies, due to concerns about climate change 
and sustainable long term returns. Statements by the Exxon Mobil chairman, Rex Tillerson, 
suggest that the company sees fossil fuels making up still 80% of global energy by 2030. 
Shell, the IOC which has made the biggest investment into renewables between 1999 and 
2006, has sold off its solar module production business in 2007, in a rather low-key 
fashion.120 The Shell statement on the subject was that the solar operation was not making 
enough money, and that it could be more profitable in other hands. Meanwhile, the company 
maintained that it was committed to developing renewable energy sources, while 
concentrating on wind power and bio-fuels.
The IOC with the biggest renewable operations, BP, is also considering spinning off the 
renewable energy division, due to concerns over its value not being reflected in BP’s share 
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117 Reuters 2008, Rockefeller family members urge ExxonMobil to "Reconnect with founder"s vision" [online], 
Reuters,  Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS171687+30-Apr-2008+PRN20080430 
[Accessed: 08.09.2008].
118 Rooney, B. 2008, Exxon investors Rockefeller proposals [online], cnn.com,  Available from: http://money.cnn.com/
2008/05/27/news/companies/exxonmobil_shareholder_meeting/index.htm?postversion=2008052816 [Accessed: 
08.09.2008].
119 Erman, M. & Bergin, T. 2008, Heavyweight investors join Rockefeller rebellion at ExxonMobil [online], 
International Herald Tribune,  Available from: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/29/business/rtrgreen02.php 
[Accessed: 08.09.2008].
120Macalister, T. 2007, Big Oil lets sun set on renewables [online], The Guardian,  Available from: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/dec/11/oil.bp [Accessed: 08.09.2008].
price.121 As the case study on BP earlier has shown, the biggest impact on the share price in 
fact has to do, simply, with dividends.
Investing in renewable energy could be the most potent answer challenge posed by decreasing 
IOC access to oil in the long-term. Oil companies will have to change into energy companies, 
but would that not put them into direct competition with power companies in a field that they 
have little expertise in? It is a far-fetched notion that Shell will become a power-generating 
company, simply because power generation is not one of their competence areas. Oil 
companies are most competent in bringing fuel products to the market. Power generation 
through renewables is not the way to go for IOCs, but rather offering a way to store that 
energy and offer it in a way that is convenient to the consumer. That, in essence, is what a fuel 
is. Gasoline is a conduit to store the energy generated by the sun millions of years ago. Rather 
than building wind farms to sell electricity to the grid, IOCs should concentrate their 
renewable energy efforts to research, finance and launch ‘the next fuel’. This fuel should, in 
the long-term, be produced by using renewable energy, since the usage of fossil fuels in the 
process would bring up the resource access problem to surface again, along with concerns 
regarding the environmental benefits of the new fuel compared to hydrocarbons. Although 
more research is needed to increase its efficiency and reduce its cost, hydrogen could be a 
viable long-term option.122 According to a report by Exxon Mobil123, the costs of creating 
hydrogen from different primary energy sources, compared to gasoline would be as such: 
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121 Hargreaves, S. 2008, BP, GM see hydrogen in their future [online], cnn.com,  Available from: http://money.cnn.com/
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08.09.2008].
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Figure 6.2, Source: Exxon Mobil 2006, Tomorrow"s energy: a perspective on energy trends, greenhouse gas 
emissions and future energy options [online], exxonmobil.com,  Available from: http://www.exxonmobil.com/
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It can be seen that producing hydrogen from actual renewable sources, such as wind or solar, 
is still prohibitively expensive. While new research may be ground breaking in this aspect, in 
the mean time other options should not remain unexplored.
It is hotly debated whether this fuel will be in the form of hydrogen, natural gas, or electricity 
stored in lithium-ion batteries. The end result might very well be a mix of these. In any case, 
IOCs should be careful not to be sidelined in the value chain of the next generation of 
transport fuels. With their large retail distribution networks, they are in a strong position to 
introduce the end consumers with the new transportation fuel. 
The effort would require the financial and human capital of more than a single IOC. It is also 
important that the next fuel becomes an industry standard, rather than a patchwork of different 
fuels being sold by each company. An industry-wide launch of such a fuel would eliminate the 
so-called chicken and egg problem related to, for instance, hydrogen. There are not enough 
hydrogen-fueled cars on the road; hence there are not enough hydrogen fuel stations. 
However, the consumers will not invest in a hydrogen-fueled car if there is no universal 
access to hydrogen fuel stations. This is not unlike the efforts to establish a new standard for 
digital discs, as Sony-led and Toshiba-led parts of the electronics industry came to a stand-off 
over whether it was Blu-ray or HD-DVD that was the ‘disc of the future’. This can be 
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avoided, by IOCs collaborating on the creation of the new fuel and setting it as an industry-
wide standard, with the cooperation of car makers. This way, IOCs will be able to kick-start a 
new product segment in the face of decreasing access they will have to upstream hydrocarbon 
resources.
It is important to note that there is no silver bullet for IOCs’ woes. They will have to employ 
all the moves suggested in this paper, and probably more, to create a new strategy that will 
allow them to address the challenges that they face. There is the now-mainstream argument 
that oil companies need to become diversified energy companies because of environmental 
concerns. Unfortunately, environmental concerns have seldom affected the corporate strategy 
of IOCs in a meaningful way. However, there is a much more economically-grounded reason 
to become a diversified energy company. That is because the most profitable part of the IOC 
value chain is crude oil, and it will only become more difficult for IOCs to have access to it. 
The industry’s long term profitability will be affected from the lack of access. To face this 
challenge, developing renewable technologies and a new transport fuel is one of the solutions.
6.1.3. Scope 
Another strategic action IOCs can take to change the game is to expand the scope of the 
game. Currently, the game consists of NOCs acting as gatekeepers to their home country 
resources, and IOCs vying to get access to these. If the NOC or its sponsor state forces the 
IOC into reducing its stake or leaving the venture, there is little the IOC can do but accept. 
Hence, IOCs need leverage. This leverage can be gained by giving the NOCs something to 
lose. If IOCs and NOCs are engaged in joint ventures in countries other than the home 
country of the NOC, they will be equal in terms of power. As the chances of future interaction 
will have increased, the partners’ temptation to defect will be dampened, due to enlarged 
shadow of the future. By expanding the scope of their interaction with NOCs, IOCs may 
increase their leverage, enlarge the shadow of the future and give NOCs a stake in the success 
of the IOC in question. Therefore, IOCs should actively seek to partner with NOCs they 
would like to build working relationships with in 3rd countries.
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Appendix
Appendix 4.a - Porter’s Five Forces Framework
Potential 
entrants
Substitutes
Supplier BuyersCompeti
tive
rivalry
bargaining
power
Threat of entry
-economies of scale
-capital requirements of 
entry
-access to supply or 
distribution channels
-experience
-expected retaliation
-legislation or 
government action
-differentiation
The power of buyers & suppliers
-concentration  of buyers / 
suppliers
-costs of switching
-backward / forward integration
Threat of substitutes
-product-for-product substitution 
(email to postal service)
-substitution of need (rendering 
redundant)
-generic substitution (competition 
for disposable income)
Competitive rivalry
-balance (size of competitors)
-growth rates (high market growth 
vs low)
-high fixed costs
-high exit barriers
-differentiation (commodity vs 
differentiated)
Source: Johnson G., Scholes K., Whittington, R., 2005, Exploring corporate strategy: text and cases, exhibit 2.5, 
p. 80, 7th edition, Prentice-Hall, London
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Appendix 4.b - Royal Dutch Shell Income, Revenue, Capital Expenditure and Profit 
Margins (2005-2007)
Shell 2007 2006 2005
Capital 
Investment
E & P
Gas & Power
Oil Sands
Oil Products
Chemicals
Corporate
Income By 
Segment
E & P
Gas & Power
Oil Sands
Oil Products
Chemicals
Corporate
Minority 
Interest
Revenue by 
Segment
E & P
Gas & Power
Oil Sands
Oil Products
Chemicals
Corporate
Profit Margins
E & P
Gas & Power
Oil Sands
Oil Products
Chemicals
27.072 100% 24.896 100% 17.436 100% 100,00%
15.919 58,80% 17.079 68,60% 11.772 67,52% 64,97%
3.532 13,05% 2.351 9,44% 1.656 9,50% 10,66%
1.931 7,13% 865 3,47% 274 1,57% 4,06%
3.856 14,24% 3.457 13,89% 2.844 16,31% 14,81%
1.419 5,24% 877 3,52% 599 3,44% 4,07%
415 1,53% 267 1,07% 291 1,67% 1,42%
31.331 100% 25.442 100% 25.311 100% 100,00%
14.686 46,87% 14.544 57,17% 13.577 53,64% 52,56%
2.781 8,88% 2.633 10,35% 1.378 5,44% 8,22%
582 1,86% 651 2,56% 661 2,61% 2,34%
10.439 33,32% 7.125 28,00% 9.982 39,44% 33,59%
2.051 6,55% 1.064 4,18% 991 3,92% 4,88%
1.387 4,43% 294 1,16% -328 -1,30% 1,43%
-595 -1,90% -869 -3,42% -950 -3,75% -3,02%
405.240 100% 364.456 100% 359.985 100% 1
53.308 13,15% 52.546 14,42% 43.281 12,02% 13,20%
17.038 4,20% 17.338 4,76% 15.872 4,41% 4,46%
2.854 0,70% 2.499 0,69% 2.464 0,68% 0,69%
286.072 70,59% 251.309 68,95% 253.853 70,52% 70,02%
45.911 11,33% 40.750 11,18% 43.996 12,22% 11,58%
57 0,01% 14 0,00% 519 0,14% 0,05%
27,5% 27,7% 31,4% 28,87%
16,3% 15,2% 8,7% 13,40%
20,4% 26,1% 26,8% 24,42%
3,6% 2,8% 3,9% 3,47%
4,5% 2,6% 2,3% 3,11%
Source: Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2007, Annual Report and Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2007 
[online], www.shell.com, p. 2,  Available from: www.shell.com/annualreport [Accessed: 29.06.2008]. Margins and 
shares of income are 3-year averages between 2005-2007.
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Appendix 4.c
Exxon Mobil Income, Capital Expenditure (2005-2007)
Exxon 2007 2006 2005
Capital 
Investment
Upstream
Downstream
Chemical
Corporate
Income By 
Segment
Upstream
Downstream
Chemical
Corporate
20.809 100% 19.716 100% 17.619 100% 100,00%
15.724 75,56% 16.231 82,32% 14.470 82,13% 80,00%
3.303 15,87% 2.729 13,84% 2.495 14,16% 14,63%
1.782 8,56% 756 3,83% 654 3,71% 5,37%
0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
40.610 100% 39.500 100% 36.130 100% 100,00%
26.497 65,25% 26.230 66,41% 24.349 67,39% 66,35%
9.573 23,57% 8.454 21,40% 7.992 22,12% 22,37%
4.563 11,24% 4.382 11,09% 3.943 10,91% 11,08%
-23 -0,06% 434 1,10% -154 -0,43% 0,21%
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Appendix 4.d
BP Income, Revenue, Capital Expenditure and Profit Margins (2005-2007)
BP 2007 2006 2005
Capital Investment
E & P
Refining & Marketing
Gas, Power & Renewables
Corporate
Income By Segment
E & P
Refining & Marketing
Gas, Power & Renewables
Corporate
Adjustment
Revenue by Segment
E & P
Refining & Marketing
Gas, Power & Renewables
Corporate
Adjustment
Profit Margins
E & P
Refining & Marketing
Gas, Power & Renewables
20.641 100% 17.231 100% 10.237 100% 100,00%
13.906 67,37% 13.118 76,13% 10.237 100,00% 81,17%
5.586 27,06% 3.144 18,25% 0,00% 15,10%
874 4,23% 688 3,99% 0,00% 2,74%
275 1,33% 281 1,63% 0,00% 0,99%
21.169 100% 22.286 100% 22.632 100% 100%
26.938 127,25% 29.629 132,95% 25.502 112,68% 124,29%
6.072 28,68% 5.041 22,62% 6.926 30,60% 27,30%
674 3,18% 1.321 5,93% 1.172 5,18% 4,76%
-1.128 -5,33% -1.069 -4,80% -569 -2,51% -4,21%
-11.387 -53,79% -12.636 -56,70% -10.399 -45,95% -52,15%
284.365 -89% 265.906 100% 252.168 100% 37%
54.550 19,18% 52.600 19,78% 47.210 18,72% 19,23%
250.866 88,22% 232.855 87,57% 213.326 84,60% 86,80%
21.369 7,51% 23.708 8,92% 25.696 10,19% 8,87%
843 0,30% 1.009 0,38% 21.295 8,44% 3,04%
-43.263 -204,37% -44.266 -16,65% -55.359 -21,95% -80,99%
49,4% 56,3% 54,0% 53,24%
2,4% 2,2% 3,2% 2,61%
3,2% 5,6% 4,6% 4,43%
Source: BP Plc, www.bp.com,BP Plc Financial and operating information archive 2008 [online],  Available 
from: http://www.bp.com/downloadlisting.do?categoryId=9010726&contentId=7021135 [Accessed: 
14.08.2008].
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Appendix 4.e
Foundations of strategic capability
Strategic capabilities and 
competitive advantage Resources Competencies
Threshold capabilities
Threshold resources
*Tangible
*Intangible
Threshold competences
Capabilities for 
competitive advantage
Unique resources
*Tangible
*Intangible
Core competences
Source: Johnson G., Scholes K., Whittington, R., (2005) Exploring corporate strategy: text and cases, p.118, exh. 
3.1, 7th edition, Prentice-Hall, London
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Appendix 4.f
Comparison of financial and operational metrics of the Big Five
Overall revenue, $ 
million (2007)
Revenue growth from 
the previous year 
(2007)
Net income $ 
million (2007)
Net income % 
change (2007)
2007
Exxon Mobil
Shell
BP
ConocoPhillips
Chevron
390328 6,80% 40610 2,81%
355782 11,60% 31926 21,3%
288951 6,78% 21169 -5,0%
194495 3% 11891 -24%
214091 4,49% 18688 9,04%
Producti
on MBD, 
crude oil 
(2007)
Production 
% change, 
crude oil 
(2007)
Production  
MMCFD, 
natural gas 
(2007)
Production 
% change, 
natural gas 
(2007)
Overall 
thousands 
BOED 
production 
(2007)
Overall 
production 
% change 
(2007)
2007
Exxon Mobil 2616 -2,42% 9384 0,54% 4180 -1,35%
Shell 1818 -6,7% 8214 -1,8% 3234 -5%
BP 2414 -2,5% 8143 -3,3% 3771,00 N/A
ConocoPhillips 854 -12% 2292 5% 2324 -1%
Chevron 1756 1,39% 5019 1,27% 2619 -1,80%
Proved 
reserves, 
BBOE 
(2007)
Proved 
reserves 
MB, fully-
owned, 
crude oil 
(2007)
Years of 
production 
left at current 
rate of 
production 
(2007)
Proved 
reserves 
BCF, fully-
owned, 
natural 
gas (2007)
Reserve 
replacement 
rate (2007)
Upstream 
capital 
investment 
, $ million 
(2007)
2007
Exxon Mobil 22,7 11074 14,9 68262 101,0% 15724
Shell 11,9 6686 10,1 N/A 79,1% 14838
BP 12,5 5492 9,08 41130 112% 13906
ConocoPhillips 10,6 3104 12,5 22499 177% 11791
Chevron 10,78 7087 11,3 22140 N/A 15538
Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual report (2007), 
Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
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Appendix 5.a.
Development of the crude oil price between 1999-2007
Oil price
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Development of the crude oil price (1999-2007)
Source: inflationdata.com 2008, Historical crude oil prices (table) [online], Inflationdata.com,  Available from: 
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp [Accessed: 14.08.2008].
Development of BP share price between 1999-2007
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Development of BP share price (1999-2007)
Source: BP Plc, www.bp.com,BP Plc Financial and operating information archive 2008 [online],  Available 
from: http://www.bp.com/downloadlisting.do?categoryId=9010726&contentId=7021135 [Accessed: 
14.08.2008].
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Appendix 5.b
Region Scores
Western Europe 2,52
North America 3,35
Pacific 3,81
East Asia 4,51
Carribean 4,51
Eastern Europe 4,51
South America 4,76
Southeast Asia 5,54
Africa 5,91
Middle East 5,94
Caspian 6,14
Russia 6,16
Central Asia 6,67
Source: Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 2007, Country ranking table 2007 [online],  Available 
from: http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/gdp_ranking.php [Accessed: 06.08.2008].
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Appendix 5.c
Assessment of the geographical spread of IOC operations
Exxon Mobil
Geographic spread Americas Europe Africa Asia Pacific/
Middle East
Russian/
Caspian
EM Share of  oil 
Production
EM Reserves %
EM reserves MB  (total)
EM '000s of BD (oil) prod.
EM reserves BCF (gas)
EM gas reserves %
EM total production
Capital exp. ($million)
27,37% 18,35% 27,41% 19,80% 7,07%
27,31% 16,74% 10,57% 36,56% 8,81%
6200 3800 2400 8300 2000
716 480 717 518 185
14802 18539 1006 32143 40720
13,81% 17,29% 0,94% 29,98% 37,98%
3183,0 3569,8 884,7 5875,1 6971,6
5266 4042 3639 6156 1750
Shell
Geographic 
spread
US Non-US 
Americas
Middle East, 
Russia & CIS
Asia 
Pacific
Africa Venezuela Europe Equity 
affiliates
Shell Share of 
Production
Shell 
Reserves %
Shell reserves 
BBOE
Shell reserves 
MB (oil & gas)
Shell '000s of 
BD (oil&gas) 
prod.
Shell 
Production 
costs/BOE
Capital exp. 
($million)
17,72% 3,83% 24,23% 12,42% 18,16% 0,49% 23,14%
7,40% 3,18% 20,10% 9,83% 7,77% 0% 13,49% 38,24%
0,801 0,344 2,176 1,064 0,841 0 1,46 4,14
801 344 2176 1064 841 1460 4140
324 70 443 227 332 9 423 N/A
8,35 14,35 8,79 4,31 7,85 0 9,15
3873 1462 3515 1326 1895 2767
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BP
Geographic 
spread
BP Share of  oil 
Production
BP oil Reserves 
%
BP reserves MB  
(oil)
BP reserves 
BCF (gas)
BP gas reserves 
%
BP '000s of BD 
(oil) prod.
BP BBOE 
reserves
US Non-US 
Americas
UK Rest of 
Europe
Asia 
Pacific
Other Africa Worldwide
21,35% 3,41% 8,36% 2,12% 9,95% 1,50% 7,12% 46,19%
31,24% 3,16% 5,33% 2,72% 1,37% 4,69% 6,02% 45,48%
3147 318 537 274 138 472 606 4581
15375 12077 2602 473 6639 1564 2400 3770
34,24% 26,90% 5,80% 1,05% 14,79% 3,48% 5,35% 8,40%
513 82 201 51 239 36 171 1110
5709,5 2330,83 970,67 352,833 1244,5 732,667 1006 5209,33
Source: Royal Dutch Shell annual report (2007), Exxon Mobil annual report (2007), BP annual report (2007), 
Chevron annual report (2007), ConocoPhillips annual report (2007)
114
Appendix 5.d
PESTEL framework - Macro-environmental influences analysis
The organization
Political
-government stability
-taxation policy
-foreign trade regulations
-social welfare priorities
Economic factors
-business cycles
-GNP trends
-interest rates
-money supply
-inflation
-unemployment
-disposable income
Technological
-government spending on 
research
-government and industry 
focus on tech effort
-new discoveries/
developments
-speed of tech transfer
-rates of obsolescence
Environmental
-environmental protection 
laws
-waste disposal
-energy consumption
Sociocultural factors
-population demographics
-income distribution
-social mobility
-lifestyle changes
-attitudes to work and leisure
-consumerism
-levels of education
Legal
-competition law
-employment law
-health and product safety
-product safety
Source: Johnson G., Scholes K., Whittington, R., 2005, Exploring corporate strategy: text and cases, exhibit 2.2, 
p.68-69, 7th edition, Prentice-Hall, London
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Appendix 6.1
The value net
IOC
Customers
ComplementorsSubstitutes
Suppliers
Source: Brandenburger, A.M. & Nalebuff, B.J. 1996, The right game: using theory to shape strategy, 
p.59, Harvard Business Review.
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